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Modeling Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability:
A Case Study of Pinellas County, Florida
Raymond A. Miller Jr.
ABSTRACT
Determining where people are most likely to suffer losses and have difficulty in
evacuating from a hurricane is important to developing a hurricane response strategy.
This thesis proposes a methodology for modeling and assessing evacuation vulnerability
to a specific hurricane and applies this method to study Pinellas County, Florida.
The vulnerability of Pinellas County to evacuation problems and the degree of
loss that may be suffered from a hurricane is quantified in the Hurricane Evacuation
Vulnerability Index. This index is the sum of three indices that represent social,
transportation, and geophysical aspects of hazards research. Social vulnerability is
assessed with an existing social vulnerability model that uses census data to locate areas
where people will have difficulty evacuating based on demographic variables. Areas
where people are vulnerable to traffic problems due to the condition of the evacuation
routes are identified with a model developed using GIS. The degree of damage these
areas may suffer from a specific hurricane is modeled using a tightly coupled GIS
program, HAZUS-MH. These loss estimates are used to identify areas where evacuation
may be necessary. The Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is mapped to show the
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areas that are most vulnerable to evacuation problems and may suffer losses to the built
environment and subsequent human displacement.
The Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is a valuable tool for emergency
planning. The results are useful in allocating and directing resources to facilitate the
evacuation of vulnerable areas. Emergency management officials can prepare evacuation
plans based on the modeled results. Traffic management strategies can be implemented to
reduce traffic congestion along evacuation routes. Transportation resources, such as
buses, can be directed to areas where people do not have the resources to evacuate.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Introduction
In 2005, two major U.S. cities, New Orleans and Houston each experienced a
major hurricane evacuation in response to Hurricane Katrina and Rita, respectively. In
New Orleans, many people, especially the poor, were unable to evacuate. These people
did not have the means to leave New Orleans and the government was not able to
adequately respond to their needs. The consequent suffering after Hurricane Katrina
impacted the Gulf Coast prompted criticism of the slow response from all levels of
government.
A month after Hurricane Katrina made landfall on Louisiana, Hurricane Rita was
projected to make landfall on Texas. The lessons learned from the New Orleans
evacuation led to a major evacuation of Houston, Texas. People who were unable to
evacuate by their own means were transported out by bus. However, a major problem in
the evacuation which occurred in both Houston and New Orleans was heavy traffic
congestion. The evacuation strategies of each of these cities did not prevent the highways
from being clogged with traffic. Consequently, especially in Houston, some people chose
to stay home, placing them at greater risk to the hurricane.
So, what if one of these hurricanes had impacted Florida, specifically Tampa
Bay? In 2004, people throughout Florida experienced at least one of four major
1

hurricanes, and some certainly suffered more than others. Two of these hurricanes,
Charley and Ivan, threatened to make landfall on the Tampa Bay metropolitan area.
Fortunately for Tampa Bay, these hurricanes made landfall elsewhere. However, the
hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005 have made evacuation a concern in the Tampa Bay
area, especially in Pinellas County, Florida. As was witnessed in the events of Hurricane
Katrina and Hurricane Rita, ability to evacuate affects how vulnerable they are to
hurricanes.
This thesis provides a methodology for modeling hurricane evacuation
vulnerability to identify locations within Pinellas County where people are vulnerable
during evacuation from a hurricane. This model identifies areas where people have
special evacuation needs, and identifies areas where people are most vulnerable to traffic
problems due to the condition of the evacuation routes. This methodology also estimates
the degree of structural loss and human displacement that will likely occur from a
hurricane in order to assess the vulnerability of Pinellas County’s built environment. The
results of this methodology are used to determine the locations of those most vulnerable
to evacuation problems, and where evacuation orders should be directed in context to a
specific hurricane, based on potential losses.
This methodology combines models pertaining to three aspects of evacuation:
social vulnerability, transportation, and geophysical impact, to answer the following
research questions:
1. Where in Pinellas County are people vulnerable to hurricane evacuation
problems?
2. What are the factors that make people vulnerable in an evacuation?
3. How vulnerable are people to suffering losses from hurricanes?
2

Chapter Organization
The second chapter of this thesis is a literature review that develops the
theoretical framework for this research. The first section describes Pinellas County and
its hurricane history. The second section describes Emergency management principles,
especially hazard response. The third section describes the problems in assessing social
groups that are vulnerable to natural hazards. This section includes the theoretical
framework of social vulnerability in context to modeling this phenomenon. The fourth
section explains the limitations of loss modeling and the role of GIS. The fifth section
describes the HAZUS-MH model developed by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency. The sixth section describes the role of evacuation in emergency response and the
different studies of evacuation.
The third chapter describes the methodology used for assessing hurricane
evacuation vulnerability of Pinellas County. The three models that are used to calculate
indices that address the social, transportation, and geophysical aspects of this research are
described. The results of these three indices are compiled into an index of hurricane
evacuation vulnerability.
The fourth chapter discusses the results of the indices. The affect of different
hurricane scenarios on the model results is examined. Then, the affect weighting
coefficients have on the model results is examined. Finally, the findings of this research
are discussed.

3

The fifth chapter concludes this thesis. The findings of this research are reviewed.
The value of the model to emergency management is described. Finally, issues for future
work are presented.

4

Chapter Two
Literature Review
Pinellas County’s Hurricane History
Pinellas County is a prime example of how, regardless of the hazards, people will
put themselves in harm’s way by living in hazardous places. Pinellas County is
vulnerable to hurricanes because of its population and its location. It is the most densely
populated county in Florida, with 3,291 people per square mile (Pinellas County
Socioeconomic Report 2004). This peninsular county is located on the west coast of
Florida bordering Tampa Bay and the Gulf of Mexico, as shown in Figure 2.1. The
county has a limited number of routes that can be used for a hurricane evacuation. People
still choose to live in this county, perhaps because there may be an acceptable level of
risk from hurricanes. A major hurricane has never been recorded to have made landfall
on Pinellas County in the 154 years of record. The desire to live in Pinellas County is the
result of people wanting to live in the sun and look out into the ocean; realtors want to
make money, and the local government wants more tax dollars (Dean 1999).
Evacuation is a critical response component of Pinellas County’s emergency
operations (PLMS 2003). This is important in evacuation analyses because the chosen
strategy will either increase or decrease the risk of injury or death from a hurricane.
People may perceive evacuating is too difficult and may choose to ride out a hurricane.
People may also believe that they are safe because “hurricanes never hit here.”

5

The population of Pinellas County would have to evacuate the majority of its
population via three causeways crossing Tampa Bay, as shown in Figure 2.1. These
evacuation routes are shared by Hillsborough County. People could evacuate north into
Pasco County, but this county is also along the coast so people would still be at risk.
Evacuation over the Sunshine Skyway Bridge south into Manatee County would only be
possible if the call to evacuate were made very early. This bridge is shut down once
winds reach 40 mph.
Figure 2.1 Pinellas County Hurricane Evacuation Routes
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The last hurricane to make landfall at Pinellas County occurred in 1921. This era
was the beginning of the northern migration to Florida from northern states to escape the
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harsh northern winters. Vacationers were nicknamed “Tin Can Tourists” because of the
canned foods they packed during there migration via automobile (Barnes 1998, 103).
On October 21, 1921 a category two hurricane made landfall on Tarpon Springs.
The U.S. Weather Bureau described the storm:
“Great damage resulted in Tampa and adjacent sections
from the combined effects or high winds and storm tides
[surge]. The tide at Tampa was 10.5 feet, the highest since
1848. Eggmond [sic] and Sanibel Island were practically
covered by water.” (Williams 2002)
According to Barnes (1998) the storm surge was the most damaging effect from
the 1921 storm. The seawall along Bayshore Boulevard in Tampa was inundated by
storm surge. The four piers of downtown St. Petersburg were destroyed. Hotels, such as
The St. Petersburg Beach Hotel and Casino at Blind Pass, were damaged by the wind and
waves. The hurricane knocked out power, causing the St. Pete Times newspaper to work
under lanterns. Otis Beard, the owner of a motorcycle shop, built a makeshift generator
from a motorcycle to operate their printing machine. The edition, known as “The
Motorcycle Extra,” was the first communication of the hurricane. An estimated eight
people died during this hurricane, and economic losses were close to three million dollars
(Barnes 1998).
The growth that has occurred in Pinellas County both in population and in
economics has not been hindered by hurricanes. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the
population of the county was 921,482 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005, Pinellas County
Socioeconomic Report 2004). The county is the most densely populated in the state with
3,291 people per square mile as of 2000 (Pinellas County Socioeconomic Report 2004).
The county witnessed its greatest period of growth between 1980 and 1990 when the
7

population increased almost forty percent, adding over 200,000 people (Pinellas County
Socioeconomic Report 2004). The eighties had little hurricane activity during this
population boom; it was not until 1990 that Tropical Storm Marco struck Pinellas County
(Barnes 1998; Williams 2002). This population is vulnerable to hurricanes not only
because there are more people and buildings at risk but also for perception reasons. When
people have not experienced a hurricane or cannot vividly remember one, people may put
themselves in harm’s way unintentionally.
An increase in the number of buildings and in property values is a result of the
increase in population (Elsner and Kara 1999, 407). Losses from hurricanes will increase
as long as property values increase. Hence, the cost of mitigating the impact of hurricanes
will escalate along with the population. This also increases problems in the disaster
insurance sector. According to Changnon et al. (1997), $400 million of the $40 billion in
losses from Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Iniki (Pacific Basin) were not reimbursed.
The vulnerability of the Tampa Bay area to hurricanes has been reaffirmed since
the late 1990’s. Hurricane Georges, September 1998, caused a mandatory evacuation of
Pinellas County in coastal areas. Hurricane Gordon, September 2000, closed the
Courtney Campbell Parkway, an evacuation route, for four hours. While none of the “Big
Four” hurricanes (Charley, Frances, Ivan, Jeanne) made landfall on Tampa Bay in 2004,
the intensity of Hurricane Frances and Jeanne were certainly felt as these storms carved
swaths through the area. Also, while the immediate meteorological effects of Hurricane
Ivan and Charley did not impact the area, preparing for these storms was still necessary.
Assessing the geophysical risk of Pinellas County to hurricanes is prone to error
because of the lack of historical data. The instance of a major hurricane making landfall
8

on Pinellas County is low based on historical records. However, these records are limited.
Nevertheless, return periods are used to measure frequencies of hazards such as floods
and storms. A return period indicates the likelihood of an event occurring based on a
number of years of record. For example, a 100-year hurricane for an area of study does
not mean that a hurricane of a particular magnitude will occur only once in 100 years. A
100-year hurricane is simply an estimate of the potential number of landfalls on an area
over a period of time. If an area experienced a hurricane ten times over a period of one
hundred years then the probability of occurrence of a hurricane is ten percent in any
given year; the return period would be ten years. Elsner and Kara (1999, 294) calculated
the return period of a hurricane making landfall on Pinellas County as 12.1 years, and the
return period for major hurricanes (category 3 or higher) is 97 years.
Some may argue that the location of Tampa Bay prevents it from being hit by a
major hurricane because the peninsula of Florida will prevent such a powerful storm from
hitting the bay area. However we saw in Hurricane Charley that a hurricane of lesser
intensity can enter the Gulf of Mexico and then increase in magnitude. Charley, once in
the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of south Florida, increased from a category two storm to
a category four storm in only three hours. Based on this, it is necessary to make early
preparations and proceed with response measures.
Response and recovery are inhibited by the geography of Pinellas County. The
limited evacuation routes and dense population make evacuation difficult. According to
the Pinellas Local Mitigation Strategy (PLMS 2003), an estimated 676,250 residents will
have to evacuate for a worst-case hurricane scenario. The PLMS also has approximately
2,000 people registered in the Special Needs Program who have limited means of
9

evacuating themselves. The limited number of evacuation routes makes clearing this
peninsular county a procedure that requires comprehensive planning. This county needs a
considerable amount of time to evacuate.
The potential to over warn can lead to a cynical public if hurricanes do not strike
and people are called to evacuate numerous times. It is estimated that in urban areas
‘false alarms’ can cost more than $100,000 per mile (Elsner and Kara 1999). However,
because forecasting still has a high degree of error, pinpointing where to evacuate and
waiting to the last minute will lead to catastrophe if the hurricane changes course. This
was seen with Hurricane Charley. The storm was projected at 11:00 am August 13, 2004
to make landfall on Tampa Bay, but three hours later Charley was projected to make
landfall on Port Charlotte approximately 100 miles south of Tampa.
Cova and Conger (2004) argued that it is difficult to quantify the effects of
hurricane winds on transportation systems because of the lack of data available. Wind can
knock down features such as trees or telephone poles creating obstructions. Hurricane
winds can blow a vehicle off a road. The Skyway Bridge, for example, is closed when
wind speeds exceed 40 mph. The closure of elevated roads, particularly Tampa Bay
bridges, therefore creates evacuation problems. Certainly there is a need to evacuate
Pinellas County early especially with the unpredictability of hurricanes.
Estimations of the resources that need to be allocated to respond to and recover
from a hurricane are also difficult because of this lack of historical data (Waugh 1998,
113). Pinellas County has not had to recover from a major hurricane since the Tampa Bay
area has developed into a metropolis. Its emergency response strategy is subject to
models and comparisons with other areas that have suffered from a hurricane.
10

The social groups that are most vulnerable need to be given careful consideration.
Pinellas County’s senior citizen population, 22.5 percent as of 2004, is considerably
higher than that of the nation, 12.4 percent, and even Florida, 17.6 percent. The migration
of seniors from the northern U.S. increases the vulnerability of Pinellas County because
these people are not usually experienced in hurricanes and may not handle its stresses the
way others can.
Another social group that is important in terms of vulnerability is the non-senior
population that has moved to Pinellas County from another state. According to the
Pinellas County Socioeconomic Report (June 2004, 24) over 60 percent of the people that
have migrated to Pinellas County are from a state other than Florida. These people may
not have experience in coping with hurricanes which may make them more vulnerable.

Hazard Response
The emergency management community has adopted a proactive approach to
hazards response (Mileti 1999; Cutter 2001; Wisner et al. 2004). Instead of reacting to
disasters, measures are taken to reduce the size of a disaster before it occurs. This
approach lies in the understanding that disasters are a result of humans interacting with
natural phenomenon that are hazardous to them. Natural hazards such as hurricanes
cannot be controlled- we know this because of course it is in our nature to try. The
National Hurricane Center created Project Stormfury (1961-1983) to develop ways that a
hurricane could be weakened or destroyed (Sheets 2001, 150). The project was a failure.
Therefore, it is important to make society less vulnerable to hurricanes rather than to
control the hurricane.
11

Reducing vulnerability is an important concept in hazard response. Burton et al.
(1993) developed a model which can be considered as a theoretical framework for
vulnerability reduction. The model contains five parts (Mileti 1999, 22):
(1) Assess hazard vulnerability.
(2) Examine possible adjustments.
(3) Determine the human perception and estimation of the hazard.
(4) Analyze the decision making process.
(5) Identify the best adjustments, given social restraints, and evaluate their
effectiveness.
This model is the foundation of Comprehensive Emergency Management which
contains four parts: Preparation, Response, Recovery, and Mitigation.
Pinellas County needs to prepare for a hurricane throughout the year, not just
during hurricane season. Responsible land use planning and the implementation and
enforcement of building codes can minimize the effects of a hurricane on the built
environment. Financial options to aid in recovery from a hurricane should also be clearly
explained to reduce the confusion people suffer from in trying to get money to repair
their homes. People can prepare their households by stocking up supplies well before a
hurricane strikes. Supply checklists that are made available in the local newspaper can be
used to assure that people have all of the essential supplies to prepare for and live through
a hurricane. The media also supplies important response information, such as evacuation
routes and hurricane shelters.
The development and continued maintenance of the hurricane response strategy
by the Pinellas County Emergency Management agency is important to evacuation. A
strategy must not only address people living in high risk areas, but also must efficiently
evacuate these people. Therefore to develop the most efficient strategy, high risk areas
12

must be identified. The ability of people to evacuate, and the adequacy of the roadways
people will use to evacuate, must be assessed.
In the event that a hurricane does make landfall on Pinellas County, the recovery
strategy must include a reentry strategy for evacuees in addition to tasks such as debris
removal, utility and infrastructure repair, medical treatment, etc. A reentry strategy is
important in reducing traffic congestion when evacuees return home. The recovery
strategy must also be continually updated, especially after problems in the strategy are
discovered after a hurricane impacts Pinellas County.
Evaluating the response and recovery strategies and preparing for hurricanes are
all part of hazard mitigation. Other parts of hazard mitigation include the development
and implementation of building codes to reduce damages to structures and better land use
planning to prevent the development in high risk areas. However, in context in coastal
development, this does not always occur. Again, mitigation must also be continually
updated as problems with emergency management plans are discovered.
An example of how comprehensive emergency management saves lives can be
found in Cuba (Wisner et al. 2004, 267). This country has a long history of hurricanes
that have killed thousands of people. However, Cuba only suffered 5 deaths from
Hurricane Michelle in 2001 as a result of timely evacuation. Approximately 700,000
people were evacuated from a population of 11 million. This was possible due to the first
time use of a CEM plan in Cuba.

13

Vulnerability
Society views natural hazards as the physical cause of loss to human
achievements (Wisner et al. 2004, 6). However, looking at hazards at a broader scale,
disasters can be viewed as the result of a natural hazard impacting humans, the triggering
of a natural event that disrupts people’s lives. Mileti (1999) organizes the factors that lead
to disasters into three categories; geophysical influences, social systems, and hazards
resulting from the built environment.
The geophysical vulnerability of a community is determined by the number and
type of geophysical events to which a community is exposed. Measurement of hurricane
risk is necessary to determine vulnerability. Tobin and Montz (1997, 52) list shared
components of hazards that control geophysical vulnerability.
•
•
•
•

Physical mechanism: magnitude, duration, spatial extent
Temporal distribution: frequency, seasonality, diurnal patterns
Spatial distribution: geographic location
Countdown interval: rapidity of commencement, preparation time, speed of
onset

Community response and recovery differs among social groups. Wisner et al.
(2004) defines social vulnerability as “the characteristics of a person or group and their
situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the
impact of a natural hazard.” The social structure of a community, i.e. economic strength
and demographic composition, will help determine its degree of social vulnerability to
hazards.
Research into the recovery of different social groups has shown that the poor,
including children, the elderly, women, and racial minorities, do not recover as well as
non-poor whites (Cutter 1996). These groups may not only have financial difficulties.
14

Cutting through red tape in dealing with the government is also more difficult for these
groups (Mileti 1999, 123). However, income status is arguably the most significant of
these factors. Wisner et al. (2004, 12-13) identifies three differences between high and
low income social groups:
1. High income social groups can afford the design engineering of their
homes to sustain the effects of a hazard.
2. High income social groups may choose to live in an area such as the coast,
while the poor may be forced to live in hazardous area like a floodplain
because that is all they can afford.
3. High income social groups have insurance and financial reserves to
recover, and can relocate if needed.
Social vulnerability is not limited to disadvantaged social groups. The increase in
population density of an area can increase the vulnerability of a community because the
resources needed to cope with a hazard are stressed. We see population outgrow
infrastructure everyday when we drive to work or school, and more and more children
enter schools with already overcrowded classrooms. Another vulnerable social group
identified by Mileti (1999) that is on the rise is unmarried people who live alone and have
children. According to the U.S. Census, over the past thirty years, the percentage of
household, “married with children” has declined from 40 percent in 1970 to 24 percent in
2000. The increase of single parents in U.S. society can hinder recovery from an event as
these people may not have the financial resources to recover as quickly as couples (Mileti
1999, 121).
The difficulty in evacuating and sheltering these social groups also adds to their
vulnerability. They may not have their own means to evacuate themselves (Lindell and
Perry, 1992), making them less inclined to evacuate. It is less likely that the poor have
their own vehicles; those that do have vehicles may have to overcrowd their automobiles
15

to help friends, neighbors, etc. This will put them at risk of having a car accident when
evacuating. Leaving their possessions behind when evacuated by public transportation
adds to the problem. Once evacuated, these groups may not even have a place to go. They
may need to go to a public shelter because they do not have friends or family elsewhere
or cannot afford a hotel. The degree of access people have to evacuation routes will either
attenuate or intensify their risk. Increased loads on the roadways of course lead to
accidents and traffic congestion. If people have options in the routes they can take to flee
the area, then there may be less stress than people with only one way out.
The economic impact of a disaster will be largely, but not solely, determined on
the vulnerability of the built environment. Building and infrastructure damage is the
largest component of direct economic losses (Mileti 1999). Communities that plan
development and mitigate building standards in consideration of hazards will be less
vulnerable than a community that does not. It may be self evident that building standards
must also be enforced by the government. It was found that only ten percent of the homes
built before 1980 were uninhabitable after Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida in
1992, while 33 percent were damaged that were built after 1980 (Mileti, 1999, 131;
Miami Herald. Special Report: What went wrong? Dec. 20, 1992). This disparity in
damages is attributed to lax building code enforcement in the 1980’s due to pressures
from builders to cut costs. An example of this is the use of asphalt shingles on roofs that
can only withstand sustained winds of 63 mph. In addition, some roofs were constructed
using waferboard (constructed of glued woodchips) rather than plywood (Miletti 1999,
131).
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In context to the Tampa Bay area, the number of manufactured homes also
presents a problem. As of 2003, there were approximately 56,000 mobile homes in
Pinellas County (PLMS, 2003, 1:14). Hurricane straps may not suffice in protecting these
homes in the event of a major hurricane and damages, as we saw in the case of Hurricane
Charley, will be immense (Tobin et al. 2005). These mobile homes are also typically
inhabited by vulnerable social groups.

Vulnerability Modeling
To model the vulnerability of a community it is necessary to assess the risk of a
natural hazard. Combining models of social vulnerability and geophysical risk is a way to
improve risk assessment and analyze mitigation strategies as recommended by the
National Resource Council’s Board on Natural Disasters (Cutter 2001 and BOND 1999).
Assessing risk is problematic because the concept of risk means different things to
different people (Slovic 1987, 283). Smith (1996, 5) defines risk as,
“the actual exposure of something of human value to a
hazard and is often regarded as the combination of
probability and loss.”
The assessment of natural hazard risk, particularly hurricanes, is performed
empirically using stochastic and meteorological models. There are numerous hurricane
models used for forecasting of tracks and estimating impacts. The tracks of hurricanes
can be forecasted with a variety of models such as the CLIPER model, developed in
1972, or the most advanced currently used model, the “Geophysical Fluid Dynamics
Laboratory (GFDL),” (Sheets 2001, 207). The effects of hurricanes such as storm surge
can be estimated using the Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges (SLOSH) model developed
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by the National Hurricane Center (NOAA, 2005). However, standardized models of
social vulnerability do not currently exist.
Modeling social vulnerability is important because it enables us to improve the
health of a community, thereby reducing the impacts of a disaster. Mileti (1999) lists
themes that will improve community health:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Maintain and, if possible, enhance environmental quality.
Maintain and, if possible, enhance people’s quality of life.
Foster local resiliency and responsibility for disasters.
Recognize that sustainable, vital local economies are essential.
Identify and ensure intra- and intergenerational equity.
Adopt a consensus-building approach, starting at the local level.

The reason there is a lack of satisfactory social vulnerability models is because
the array of social factors that make a community vulnerable are not fully known.
Lindsay (2003) argues that the establishment of a hierarchy of these social factors is also
disputable. While past disasters such as Hurricane Andrew proved that certain groups had
difficulty in recovery, the factors that determine social vulnerability are more complex
than simply income level, age, and gender. Furthermore, quantifying social vulnerability
and classifying people based on their degree of vulnerability is not something we can do
the way hurricanes are classified with the Saffir-Simpson scale.
Lindsay (2003) argues that the same factors that cause people to be vulnerable to
hazards can be found in health studies. Much like hazards studies, health has evolved
from a healing approach to a concept of wellness. The World Health Organization states
that “socioeconomic conditions and the social and physical environments are key in
determining people’s health and well being” (Zollner and Lessof, 1998, 2; Lindsay 2003,
293). Health Canada (1996) lists income and social status; social support networks;
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education; employment and working conditions; social environments; physical
environments; biology and genetic empowerment; personal health practices and coping
skills; health child development and child services; gender; culture; education.
While the debate over the socioeconomic characteristics that should be considered
in modeling will continue, it is important to consider the theoretical framework in order
to develop such a model. Wisner et al. (2004) proposed two models, The Disaster
Pressure and Release Model (PAR), and the Access Model.
Wisner et al. (2004, 49) argued that the risk of a disaster is a compound function
of the natural hazard and the number of people, characterized by their varying degrees of
vulnerability to that specific hazard, who occupy the space and time of exposure to that
hazard event. Simply, risk can be considered as the product of a hazard and vulnerability.
The PAR model identifies people that are under “pressure,” for example poor people.
Releasing the pressure that these people are under will in turn lessen the impact of a
disaster. This model is linked with the Access Model. The Access model considers the
resources people have to cope with a disaster. In context to hurricane evacuation,
identifying populations under pressure and releasing this pressure can be conducted by
assessing the ability of people to evacuate. For example, people with automobiles or
people living in areas with evacuation route options will be under less pressure when
evacuating.
Tobin et al. (2005) assessed the vulnerability of Florida counties and found that
the proportion of vulnerable people has increased in the past thirty years. This increase is
not necessarily due to the increase in population, but because particular social groups that
are vulnerable have grown. This is significant because emergency management must
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evaluate operations over time and determine if its planning is suitable to respond to these
vulnerable populations. As the population of Pinellas County increases, so does
vulnerability (Chakraborty et al. 2005). It is important to determine if the increase in
population is of groups that are socially vulnerable. Also more people mean more
problems in evacuations, and population seems to always outgrow infrastructure. Past
disasters such as Hurricane Hugo in 1999 proved that these vulnerable populations were
not considered in recovery efforts (Wisner et al. 2004, Miller and Simile 1992).

Loss Modeling
Measuring disaster loss is a difficult undertaking. While some estimates such as
deaths and the number of buildings damaged may appear to be straight forward, past
events such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the 1906 San Francisco earthquake proved
otherwise. These estimates are difficult because not only is the process of counting deaths
and destroyed buildings difficult urban areas, but these estimations can lead to negative
perceptions of not only the affected area but also the government and its response efforts.
According to Comerio (1998, 31), the actual number of deaths resulting from the “Great
Earthquake of 1906” in San Francisco was closer to 3,000 rather than the officially
reported 498, but the government did not want to shock insurance companies in the
eastern U.S. looking to expand to the west coast and also did not want to discourage
people from moving out west.
Damages from Hurricane Andrew were estimated at $25 billion; however, the
number of buildings destroyed was not immediately known because the destruction was
so severe. Early estimates were performed by estimating damage for areas with particular
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building densities (Comerio 1998, 33). Comparative estimates were then performed based
on these densities.
The use of computer models for analyzing and simulating hurricanes range in
applications from meteorological to structural engineering. There are a variety of
forecasting models used to determine the potential track of a hurricane. The results of
such models are often displayed together on a map, commonly referred to by the media as
a ‘spaghetti model,’ to display the different modeled tracks a hurricane may follow.
The effects of a hurricane, such as storm surge, are also modeled. The Sea, Lake,
and Overland Surges (SLOSH) model quantifies coastal flooding from hurricanes. Much
of the damage resulting from hurricanes results from storm surge. A category 5 hurricane
will have a storm surge that is in excess of 5 meters causing catastrophic damage to all
structures within 150 meters of the coast (Elsner 1999, 22). Therefore, this model is
useful because it helps emergency planners calculate where evacuation may be needed in
the event of a hurricane. However, damage to infrastructure and buildings from saltwater
can occur for an indefinite amount of time, making damage estimates from storm surge
impossible (Wisner et al. 2004, 246 and Campbell 1984).
There is great breadth in the modeling of geophysical components of a hurricane.
Estimating loss from hurricanes, however, is in its infancy. Models can use either
deductive or inductive approaches in modeling hazards (Cova and Conger 2004).
Deductive approaches model the physical nature of hurricanes to estimate losses. For
example, estimating maximum sustained winds estimated at a census tract, one can
determine the degree of building damage. An inductive study considers past observations
and estimates loss based on the characteristics of past studies. Loss estimations include
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calculating direct economic loss, such as building damage; indirect economic loss,
employment or revenue; and human losses. It was found that loss was severely
underestimated in post disaster surveys of Hurricane Andrew (Wisner et al. 2004).
Pielke (1997) identifies four challenges for identifying and quantifying losses:
production of multiple-order impacts; direct and indirect costs; difficulty in quantifying
intangibles; and tallying up losses versus benefits. An even more perplexing problem in
loss estimation is human and cultural loss. Placing a value on human life brings about
ethical and equality issues (Cutter 2001).
Pinellas County currently uses The Arbiter of Storms (TAOS) model to assess
potential damages to communities (PLMS 2003). The TAOS model simulates the effects
of a hurricane (wind, waves, translation speed, storm surge, and inland flooding from
rainfall) to assess damages to communities. It produces structural damage estimates as
well as debris generation. This model does have drawbacks, such as the inability to
estimate human displacement, and the inability to estimate loss from specific hurricanes
in real time.
Most important in loss modeling is the ability to simulate a hurricane’s effects in
order to estimate damages. As the knowledge of hurricanes continues to grow through
research and technological advancements, the accuracy of loss models needs to improve.
Watson et al. (2004) examined the “state of the art” of hurricane loss modeling in
a review of nine wind models, four surface friction models, and nine damage models
created by various agencies in the engineering, meteorology, and insurance disciplines. It
is important to note that many of these models are proprietary and the inner workings of
the models are generally trade secrets to the agencies producing them. Therefore analysis
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of the accuracy of these models is limited to comparative studies of models with observed
hurricane losses. These models are embedded with models for wind, surface roughness,
and damage coefficients to estimate losses. The refinement of these models includes
developing new ways of measuring surface roughness using land use, more accurate
elevation models, as well as configuring damage coefficients for individual building
types such as wood or concrete. While there is merit in enhancing these models Watson
et al. (2004) argued that the greatest emphasis of future research should be placed on the
enhancement of the meteorological understandings of hurricanes. Parametric wind
models, such as the model used in the TAOS model, need more accurate hurricane wind
data than just wind speed, eye radii, pressure, and translation speed. Watson et al. (2004)
compared the results of hurricane loss models applied to North Carolina and found that
surface roughness had negligible results between models. The reason for this result may
be because different storms deposit peak winds on a given location from different
directions, thus potentially averaging out the impact of surface friction over many storms
(Watson 2004, 1723-1724). Enhancing the damage coefficients will only be worthwhile
once the understanding of hurricane force winds improves. The damage functions are
highly nonlinear: average structural damage could be 10 percent at 100 mph, 25 percent
at 130 mph, and 80 percent at 160 mph (Watson 1724, 2004).
The proprietary nature of the loss models examined by Watson is cause for an
accepted tested methodology for estimating hurricane loss models. FEMA has addressed
this with the hurricane wind model in HAZUS-MH. This computer is programmed to
estimate structural damage and human displacement from hurricanes and other natural
hazards. The hurricane wind model takes modeling beyond the parametric level at a
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single location. HAZUS-MH develops a hurricane over its entire life cycle so damages
correlate to the changes a hurricane undergoes when it makes landfall. The HAZUS-MH
wind model does not statically model a hurricane such that damages are simply a function
of a one static hurricane at one location at one ‘snapshot’ in time, the method used by the
TAOS model. Instead, hurricane forces are simulated over space and time to more
realistically model a hurricane. Hurricane forces decrease as the distance from the eye
wall increases and the hurricanes forces change as it travels over land and water.
Loss estimations are dependent on historical hurricane data to calculate the
probability of landfall at particular locations. Knowledge of past tracks as well as the
physical parameters (wind speed, pressure, etc.) of these hurricanes is important in
predicting losses. The Hurricane Research Division of the National Hurricane Center has
been reanalyzing hurricanes from 1851 to the present to create a database of past
hurricanes. This database is called HURDAT, the official record of tropical storms and
hurricanes for the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, including those
that have made landfall in the United States (http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/hurdat/).
The reanalysis of past hurricanes is partly due to the extensive damage that
occurred in south Florida when Hurricane Andrew swept across the state, when a debate
ensued over the magnitude of Andrew. According to Rappaport (1994) Andrew
completely destroyed over 25,000 homes and damaged over 100,000. Approximately
90% of all mobile homes were destroyed. Economic losses to agriculture were over $1
billion; total direct losses exceeded $26 billion (Landsea et al. 2004, 1700). There have
been indirect economic effects as well. Ten years later the average property insurance has
increased tenfold. Landsea et al. (2004) reanalyzed the intensity of Hurricane Andrew
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and determined that Hurricane Andrew was in fact a category five hurricane when it
made landfall on south Florida. Andrew’s winds were originally estimated at 128 kt;
however, the reanalysis approximated winds at 145 kt at landfall on Fender Point, FL (13
km NE of Homestead, FL).
The updated HURDAT database is important because this database gives us the
most accurate current record of past storms. HAZUS-MH uses this database in generating
stochastic hurricane scenarios. Due to the low frequency of hurricanes in the Tampa Bay
area, stochastic hurricane models will be sensitive to the past hurricanes that have
impacted the area both by direct landfalls and near misses.
The advances that GIS has undergone and its increasing use in both natural and
human environmental studies make it an excellent tool for modeling hurricane risk and
vulnerability. Comprehensive emergency management is greatly served by GIS because
an infinite number of spatial themes, i.e. demographics, roadways, potential hurricane
tracks, can be managed in one environment.
Bales and Waugh (1996), describe the role GIS played in Hurricane Andrew. The
technology was an integral part of response and recovery. The usefulness of GIS is not
limited to just spatial analyses. It will also aid in avoiding duplication of efforts by
government agencies and avoid development of incompatible technologies (Bales and
Waugh, 1996 329; Tobin and Montz, 2004a). Centralized databases such as the Florida
Geographic Data Library (FGDL), the U.S. Census Bureau’s Topologically Integrated
Encoding and Referencing (TIGER), and the USGS Seamless Data Distribution System
offer geographic data that can be used for GIS analyses. For the most part, to create an
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inventory of data is unnecessary because there are quality data already available.
However, people who specialized in GIS are required to insure that it is used properly.
Although GIS was used in recovery efforts, the Miami-Dade County Government
did not utilize GIS to prepare for Hurricane Andrew. Technologies such as HAZUS-MH
did not exist to estimate losses from Hurricane Andrew. Although the South Florida
Water Management District used GIS to assess environmental impacts, modeling of
urban impacts was not performed. A private company, Digital Matrix Services, Inc.,
volunteered its services of GIS mapping to the recovery efforts. The maps they provided
helped 82 different agencies in the relief efforts (Bales and Waugh 1996, 333). Aerial
photography was useful for assessing areas by comparing pre-Andrew and post-Andrew
aerial imagery. Although DMS’s services were invaluable, it was realized that GIS was
not effectively used during Hurricane Andrew and that this technology would be needed
in the future. Recommendations from Andrew (Bales and Waugh 1996, 339):
1. A strong GIS capability could have made the response more effective and might
have speeded the recovery.
2. Databases need to be created beforehand, rather than pieced together amidst the
chaos of a disaster operation.
3. Databases need to be easily transferable among GIS users.
4. Emergency managers and public officials need to understand the capabilities of
GIS analysis in order to better use it.
HAZUS-MH
Introduction
FEMA’s National Mitigation Strategy is based on the principle of communicating
to people the risks that surround them in order to better prepare them for a hazard
(Haddow and Bullock 2003, 9-12). This will better enable them to respond to and recover
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from a hazard. The nomination of James Lee Witt of FEMA by President Clinton in
1993, a year after Andrew, triggered the national effort to work to minimize risk by
mitigation and the use of technologies such as GIS. Part of FEMA’s strategy involves
modeling risk of hazards using a state of the art GIS program, HAZUS-MH.
The HAZUS model, initially released in 1997, was developed to estimate losses
from earthquakes. HAZUS was developed by FEMA and the National Institute of
Building Sciences (NIBS).
The model has evolved into a multi-hazard loss estimation tool, HAZUS-MH
(Hazards U.S. Multi-Hazard). This program now includes flooding and wind damage
along with earthquakes. The hurricane model is programmed to estimate socioeconomic
losses from hurricane winds in order to assist emergency operations personnel in
evaluating, planning for, and mitigating the effects of hurricane winds. It can also assist
policy makers in reducing wind damage to structures, reducing disaster payments, and
better utilizing emergency management resources.
The 2004 Hurricane Season was the first time that FEMA used HAZUS-MH.
When Hurricane Ivan was projected to make landfall on the Florida panhandle, FEMA
used this model to estimate losses in an effort to help local emergency management cope
with Ivan.
The hurricane model is the first component of the HAZUS wind model.
Figure 2.2 shows the elements of the wind model, with the currently modeled elements
highlighted in bold text. The model does not include the effects of storm surge, waves,
and atmospheric pressure change. The next generation of the model will include these
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effects along with other severe weather such as thunderstorms, hail, tornadoes, and
extratropical storms.
It is important to note that tornadoes do occur during hurricanes. The magnitude
of these tornadoes ranges from F-0 to F-1 on the Fujita scale. However, stronger
tornadoes have been reported in major hurricanes. For example, Hurricane Isbell, October
1964, produced four F-2 tornadoes (Elsner 1999, 27). Tornadoes are not included in the
modeling conducted in this thesis, although potential wind damages to buildings resulting
from tornadoes may be severe.
Table 2.1 shows damage estimates consisting of building related losses, such as
direct property damage, and business interruption losses (unable to run business due to
damage) in terms of replacement value. The total number of buildings at least moderately
damaged is estimated as well as the number of buildings completely destroyed. The
probability of damage to specific building types (agriculture, industrial, residential,
education) and the number of these buildings damaged are categorized by the level of
damage sustained: minor, severe, total destruction (Table 2.2). Building damage to
essential facilities, Emergency Operation Centers, fire stations, hospitals, schools, etc, is
also estimated in terms of the number of these facilities damaged and the extent of
damage. The expected loss of use is measured in days. An example of these damages is
shown in Table 2.3. The number of hospital beds that would be lost in a hurricane and the
availability of these beds one week and one month after the hurricane are also measured.
Debris generation is estimated in tons of reinforced concrete/steel, brick/wood, and tree
debris. The number of truckloads (at 25 tons per truck) is given to assist in debris
removal.
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Figure 2.2 HAZUS-MH Wind Model Elements

Table 2.1 Example of Building-Related Economic Loss Estimates
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Table 2.2 Example of Expected Building Damage by Occupancy Report

Table 2.3 Example of Critical Facility Damage Report

In addition to human impacts described earlier, HAZUS-MH has other advantages
over TAOS. The TAOS model does not have the dynamic modeling capabilities of
HAZUS-MH. One cannot program current parameters of threatening hurricanes and alter
these parameters as the hurricane travels across water and land. TAOS does not estimate
damages to critical facilities or how long they will be out of service. HAZUS-MH even
estimates the percentage of hospital beds that will be out of service and how long.
HAZUS-MH offers a wide variety of data shown in Figure 2.3 that can be mapped and
used in emergency operations.
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Figure 2.3 Hurricane Loss Estimation Methodology Outputs

Cutter (1996, 530) lists three factors as the causes of disasters: risk exposure,
vulnerability as social response, and vulnerability of place. For example, coastal areas are
at a greater risk from hurricanes than inland areas. Areas along the coast can be compared
with each other to determine which coastal areas are at the greatest risk. Mitigation of
building practices can be developed to decrease the risk of these vulnerable areas. Critical
facilities and evacuation routes are essential in response activities. If a hurricane is
projected to landfall, the number of facilities that may be damaged can be assessed so
responders do not send people to these facilities. HAZUS-MH is valuable in locating
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areas that are likely to suffer the most destruction and recovery efforts can be made to
remove debris.
As noted, the hurricane model includes the effects of wind pressure, wind borne
debris missiles, tree blow down, and rainfall. Storm duration is included to simulate the
temporal effects of the storm. Storm surge is not currently used.
Probabilistic hurricane scenarios use return period loss estimates. It is
recommended that for scenario modeling, a maximum credible hurricane scenario be
developed that is possible for the study area. According to the PLMS (2003, 1:15) the
worst case scenario for Pinellas County is a Category 5 Hurricane heading northeast at
less than 15 miles per hour that makes landfall at high tide near New Port Richey. A 24
foot storm surge would inundate almost half of the County while the winds would destroy
hundreds if not thousands of homes and cause damage to thousands more.

HAZUS-MH Hurricane Model
Referring to the work by Watson (2004), hurricane models calculating the effects
of winds on buildings using roughness coefficients are dependent on the accuracy of
wind models. These models are based solely on the parameters of hurricanes such as
wind speed, pressure, eye radius, etc. A hurricane is simulated only at the study area. The
track of movement of a hurricane is not considered.
The hurricane wind model calculates the maximum sustained wind speeds and the
peak gust wind speeds for census tracts. The model simulates the track of a hurricane
from its formation in the Atlantic Ocean through its track, in the case of this thesis Tampa
Bay, to its dissipation in the northern latitudes. As described by FEMA (2005a), central
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pressure is modeled as a function of sea surface temperature, and the storm heading,
speed, etc., are updated at each six-hour point in the storm history. Linear interpolation is
used between the six-hour points. The approach is validated by comparing the sitespecific statistics of the key hurricane parameters of the simulated hurricane tracks with
the statistics derived from the historical data. The historical data use the current
HURDAT database compiled by the NHC’s Hurricane Research Division.
Validation of this model was performed by measuring the modeled wind speeds
against observed wind speeds of twelve hurricanes. Based on these observations FEMA
claims that this hurricane model is the most advanced model available. For further
description of the model see FEMA 2005a.

HAZUS Hurricane Model Methodology
The basic steps in operating the model are:
1. Selecting the study area: census tract, county, state.
2. Specify hurricane hazard: a single user-defined scenario such as an oncoming
hurricane; or probabilistic analysis.
3. Provide additional user collected data of buildings, tree coverage, surface
roughness, etc., if possible.
4. Formulas embedded in HAZUS, damage probabilities, expected building losses,
loss-of-use are computed for different classes of buildings. Amounts and types of
debris are also generated.
5. Results are used to compute damage estimates and shelter needs.
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Evacuation
Introduction
The decrease of hurricane activity in the 60’s and the rapid population growth in
Florida, particularly along the coast, has led to increases in vulnerability. The decrease in
hurricanes also has caused a decrease in the public awareness of hurricanes and how to
respond to them. Sheets and Williams (2001) argue that the attention given to the Cold
War and nuclear evacuations during the seventies and eighties may have contributed to
the lack of attention to hurricane evacuations. Hurricane evacuation has not been studied
as intensely as other evacuation strategies, especially nuclear response. Nuclear
evacuation does not have the same temporal component that hurricane evacuation does.
A nuclear evacuation would have little warning and everyone within an area, for example
a 10 mile buffer, would need to evacuate as soon as possible. Hurricane evacuation is of
course more complicated due to issues such as fluctuations in forecasting and
determining the areas to be evacuated.
Transportation is one of the most important aspects of response and recovery
during a hurricane (Cova and Conger 2004). It is important that emergency management
agencies develop and maintain evacuation strategies that enable people to leave at risk
areas in the most efficient way possible. Such strategies, once developed, need to be
updated to address changes in areas such as population increases due to development, and
infrastructure such as road construction projects. The problems that arise in evacuation
planning are founded on the same themes as assessing natural hazard vulnerability: social
vulnerability, the conditions of the built environment, and geophysical risk.
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Projecting the track of a hurricane is fortunately something we can do with
reasonable accuracy. We can forecast where a hurricane will likely go within 36 to 48
hours. We can to some degree prepare for the onset of a hurricane by boarding windows,
stocking food supplies, etc. However this 36 to 48 hour window is still too large in
determining exactly where a landfall will occur, so only the potentially impacted area can
be evacuated. Barret et al. (2000) argued that with 36 or more hours of warning, most
evacuations can be performed. Therefore, until our understanding of hurricanes develops
more accurate forecasting models, we need to err on the side of caution and evacuate
potentially large areas at a time where the average citizen may feel is premature.
According to the Pinellas County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the
clearance time for the county is ten to seventeen hours depending on the size of the
evacuation area. However, because a large evacuation has never occurred in Pinellas, the
upper estimates may not be reliable, particularly if they are calculated with standard
traffic simulators.
Human perception in hurricane response is the most difficult if not impossible to
predict in context to evacuation. The public can place too much faith in hurricane
forecasts causing them to stay home. In the case of Hurricane Charley, Tobin et al. (2005)
determined that one of the main reasons people did not evacuate in Charlotte County is
because the people Charley would make landfall on Tampa Bay. These people along with
the rest of Florida focused on the “line” used by television news services that projected
Charley’s track at Tampa Bay instead of focusing on the large swath that encompassed
the line. The media were blamed for communicating the line as the area most at risk
when in reality the swath encompassing the line was the area at risk.
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People may choose not to evacuate because of fears of looting, which is usually
overblown by the media. However, as was witnessed in New Orleans in the Hurricane
Katrina disaster, looting was a problem. Other reasons not to evacuate are the refusal to
leave pets and personal effects behind, and the feeling that there is nowhere to go. During
Hurricane Charley, many evacuated from the coast inland to the Orlando area, only to put
themselves directly in the path of the still dangerous storm.
For the people that do evacuate, their strategy may not be the same as the
evacuation strategy of the local emergency management agency. DeSilva (2001) argues
that there are two groups who will perceive evacuation differently, the evacuees and the
evacuators. The routes that emergency management officials want the public to use and
the destination once evacuation is complete will likely differ from those perceived by the
evacuees.
The roads that are used in evacuation and the availability of safe places to go will
determine how and if people evacuate. People may not evacuate if they feel they will be
stuck in gridlocked traffic. People with pets may not go to a shelter due to a lack of pet
friendly public shelters. The poor may not evacuate because of financial restraints. If a
low income family does not have family or friends to stay with, they may not be able to
afford to stay at a hotel.
The type of homes people live in will contribute to their perceived vulnerability.
If a family lives in a home that they feel will withstand a hurricane then they may not
evacuate. This perception may be wrong. Tobin et al. (2005) found that people did not
evacuate because they felt that they were safe in their homes, only to have Hurricane
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Charley blow the roofs off. Some did not evacuate until after Charley passed through
Charlotte County.
Lindell and Perry (1992) identify two problems with evacuation. The first
problem is transportation support. An example of this problem lies in social vulnerability.
Social groups who are more vulnerable, such as the poor, the very young and very old,
are also likely not to have means of evacuating themselves so emergency planning must
accommodate these people. Also, there is a percentage of people that do not have
automobiles and rely on public transportation out of personal choice. However, if an area
will not be congested because the evacuating population does not have cars then it may
be that it is less likely that traffic problems will arise during an evacuation. The people
may be evacuated by bus, thus decreasing the load on the roadways. Therefore, local
emergency management agencies must assess their means of evacuating these people.
The second problem identified by Lindell and Perry (1992) is traffic management.
This problem deals with traffic congestion, construction zones, obstructions such as
downed trees or powerlines, etc. These two problems ask two questions:
1. Are people vulnerable because of the infrastructure, in this case the traffic
conditions of the evacuation routes?
2. Are people vulnerable because they do not have personal means of
evacuation?
Lindell et al. (1992, 91) listed a number of ways that evacuation can be managed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Identify areas that are susceptible to the hazard.
Assess the vulnerable population of the susceptible areas.
Assess the capabilities of the affected population to evacuate.
Assess the adequacy of the roadways.
Identify problem areas in the evacuation.
Design mitigation to deal with problem areas.
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This methodology can be viewed as the process of assessing evacuation
vulnerability. Hazardous areas are identified through hurricane loss modeling. The
vulnerability of communities is assessed using demographic data. The evacuation routes
are analyzed using GIS to identify areas that are likely to have traffic problems.

Evacuation Modeling
The literature pertaining to evacuation consists of studies with a traffic
engineering perspective. These studies are mainly temporal, focusing on clearing times of
evacuation zones and travel times of evacuation routes. A number of studies simulated
the flow of traffic of potential evacuation scenarios (Sinuany-Stern and Stern 1993;
Southworth 1991; Cova and Johnson 2003). Also, traffic management strategies such as
contraflow, the practice of reversing lanes to increase highway capacity, were tested to
analyze how this strategy can increase traffic flow (Cova and Conger 2004; Wolshon
2001). Sorenson et al. (1992) studied ways of delimiting emergency planning zones.
Cova and Church (1997) developed a method using GIS for assessing the evacuation
vulnerability of neighborhoods by identifying potential evacuation bottlenecks.
The literature is scarce, however, on how the conditions of the transportation
system affect people’s vulnerability. Chakraborty et al. (2005) assessed evacuation
vulnerability as a function of geophysical risk and social vulnerability. This study found
that evacuators need to consider not only places where damages will be severe, but also
places where people are highly vulnerable because of a lack of evacuation resources,
even though tangible losses may not be severe. Evacuation modeling needs to take a
multi-faceted approach especially in dealing with hurricanes.
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Barret et al. (2000) proposed a theoretical framework for a dynamic hurricane
evacuation model. They characterized the components of hurricane evacuation as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

advanced warning of onset
knowledge of the speed of onset and magnitude of hurricane
knowledge of high risk locations
evacuation on a regional scale
the potential for large damages to the evacuation road network
Modeling evacuation using “off the shelf” transportation programs may not be the

solution to solving evacuation problems. Models and algorithms specified and calibrated
in ordinary conditions cannot be directly applied in emergency conditions (Russo and
Vinetta 2002, 315). Barret et al. (2000) argued that one cannot use general traffic
modeling because of the extreme nature of a hurricane evacuation. They recommend then
that the number of individuals needing evacuation and the demographic conditions of the
evacuees be modeled. In other words, transportation models that consider rush hour
traffic to the central business district will not work in evacuation studies. Evacuation
modeling must consider very large volumes of traffic flowing continuously in one
direction until the “at risk” area is cleared. Destination is also a factor that is different. In
modeling Pinellas County, the concern is to get everyone out using a limited number of
routes; modeling transportation will have an infinite number of destinations and larger
flexibility of routes.

Theoretical Framework
This review of the literature pertaining to hazard vulnerability analysis, hurricane
modeling, and evacuation studies explains the concepts and problems in modeling
hurricane response. An understanding of these concepts is necessary to the development
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of a method of analyzing hurricane evacuation vulnerability and applying this method to
Pinellas County, Florida.
Evacuation is a critical component to Pinellas County’s hurricane response plan
because of its landscape. Factors such as high population density and the limited number
of evacuation routes demand careful planning in evacuating this peninsular county.
Therefore, in responding to a hurricane it is necessary to determine where problems are
likely to occur and where evacuation assistance is needed.
The goal of this thesis is to develop a model of hurricane evacuation vulnerability.
This model is based on the theoretical framework developed in this literature review and
is designed to answer the following research questions:
1. Where in Pinellas County are people vulnerable to hurricane evacuation
problems?
2. What are the factors that make people vulnerable in an evacuation?
3. How vulnerable are people to suffering losses from hurricanes?
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Chapter Three
Methodology
Introduction
This chapter will describe the methods used to model evacuation vulnerability.
The term evacuation vulnerability is used in context to the level of difficulty people will
have in evacuating from a hurricane. While it is possible to focus on evacuation
vulnerability solely from a transportation perspective, the model developed in this thesis
combines social, transportation, and geophysical aspects of natural hazards research in
order to assess evacuation vulnerability from a broader perspective. This model produces
an index that when mapped, identifies locations within Pinellas County where evacuation
problems will likely occur and the degree of damage that may be expected in these areas
from a particular hurricane.
This chapter begins with a brief review of Pinellas County’s vulnerability to
hurricanes and the importance of evacuation. Then, the methods used to quantify the
social, transportation, and geophysical components of the Hurricane Evacuation
Vulnerability Index (HEVI) are introduced. Next, the spatial resolution of the HEVI is
explained. The next three sections describe the methods used to model the social,
transportation, and geophysical aspects of the HEVI. In the fourth section, the
compilation of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is described.
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Modeling Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability in Pinellas County, Florida
As discussed earlier, evacuating Pinellas County in the event of a major hurricane
is problematic because of its landscape and high population density. The low elevation of
this peninsular county makes it vulnerable to coastal flooding. Pinellas County is
especially vulnerable to a hurricane traveling over the Gulf of Mexico that comes within
close proximity to or makes landfall on the county. Pinellas County is the most densely
populated county within the state of Florida with a population density of 3,291 people per
square mile (U.S. Bureau of the Census). During an evacuation, the majority of the
evacuees would have to travel across bridges one of four bridges over Tampa Bay. The
methods described in this chapter are used to develop a model of evacuation vulnerability
that combines different aspects of hazards research. The research questions this thesis
will answer are:
1. Where in Pinellas County are people vulnerable to hurricane evacuation
problems?
2. What are the factors that make people vulnerable in an evacuation?
3. How vulnerable are people to suffering losses from hurricanes?
Census tracts within Pinellas County are indexed based on their level of hurricane
evacuation vulnerability. This Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index (HEVI) is the
compilation of three indices that represent different aspects of hazards vulnerability
analyses: social vulnerability, evacuation vulnerability, and geophysical impact to the
built environment. Each of these indices is compiled using different methods.
Geophysical impact to the built environment is assessed based on the model
results of a tightly coupled GIS program, HAZUS-MH. Evacuation vulnerability is
modeled in a GIS environment using ESRI’s ArcGIS 9.1. Social vulnerability is the least
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intensive from a GIS data processing perspective. This component uses statistical
calculations to assess vulnerability.
The social component models social vulnerability using a method developed by
Chakraborty et al. (2005). Demographic variables such as poverty are compiled in an
index quantifying the degree to which social groups may have difficulty evacuating. This
Social Vulnerability Evacuation Assistance Index combines elements of population and
structure, differential access to resources, and special needs populations attempting to
address certain social traits that may impede ones ability to evacuate and require
evacuation assistance from emergency management agencies
(Chakraborty et al. 2005, 26).
The evacuation vulnerability component focuses on the evacuation route network
of Pinellas County to identify areas where evacuation may be impeded due to traffic
problems. The Evacuation Vulnerability Index (EVI) is derived from a GIS model that
calculates where traffic congestion may be the greatest as well as the distance that
households travel to evacuate.
The geophysical component of this model is called the Hurricane Loss Estimation
Index. This index is calculated using modeled results from the HAZUS-MH software.
Damage estimates are used to index census tracts based on the degree of structural
damage that may occur in the event of a hurricane. This component of the HEVI aims to
identify the areas that may suffer the most damage from a particular hurricane and will
need to evacuate as well as to provide a researcher a means to use the HEVI to assist in
evacuation planning. For example, a hypothetical scenario could be modeled if a
researcher wanted to evaluate evacuation vulnerability in context to a specific hurricane
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(Tobin et al. 2004b). The HLEI is compiled twice, using loss estimates of hurricanes of
two different return periods. The two Hurricane Loss Estimation Indices are compiled to
test the sensitivity of the HEVI to different hurricanes.
The Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index (HEVI) is the sum of the Social
Vulnerability Evacuation Assistance Index (SVEAI), Evacuation Vulnerability Index
(EVI), and Hurricane Loss Estimation Index (HLEI). The sensitivity of the modeled
results of the HEVI will be tested in two ways. First, by using two different hurricanes to
examine how different hurricane intensities and tracks will affect the values of the HEVI.
Second, by examining how weighting each of the three indices will affect the values of
the HEVI.
The spatial resolution of this analysis is at the census tract level because of
HAZUS-MH. The software estimates loss at the census tract level. The SVEAI and EVI
index can be calculated at a level of higher spatial resolution, for example, than census
block group. However, because the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is only as
detailed as the coarsest scale of its three components, the census tract level is used for the
analysis.
The methods described here are applied to empirically assess Pinellas County’s
vulnerability however, these methods are applicable to other counties where hurricanes
are among the natural hazards that a county experiences.

Social Vulnerability Evacuation Assistance Index (SVEAI)
Social vulnerability is modeled using a methodology designed by Chakraborty et
al. (2005). This study calculates a Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index
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using the socioeconomic variables in Figure 3.1.The census tracts within Pinellas County
are assigned a Social Vulnerability Evacuation Access score. This score is calculated as
follows (Chakraborty et al. 2005, 26):
1. Determine the ratio of the variable in each block
group to the total number of that variable in Pinellas
County (Ri).
2. Compute a standardized social vulnerability for
evacuation assistance index (SVEAIi) for variable i
using the maximum ratio value (Rmax) observed in
Pinellas County.
SVEAIi = Ri
Rmax
3. To combine multiple variables in the assessment of
social vulnerability, calculate the arithmetic mean of
the vulnerability indices by dividing the sum of
index values of all variables by the number of
variables (n) considered.
SVEAI = SVEAIi
n
This calculation results in values ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 represents those who are
most socially vulnerable and need help evacuating.
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Figure 3.1 Framework of Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index

Evacuation Vulnerability Index (EVI)
Evacuation vulnerability is modeled with GIS using ESRI’s ArcGIS 9.1.
Evacuation vulnerability is assessed by two variables. The first variable, Evacuation
Route Intersection Load is based on the number of households that will utilize an
intersection of roadways as their entering point of the evacuation route network as
mapped by Pinellas County Emergency Management. This variable determines the
population load that each evacuation route intersection will be under during an
evacuation. Population load in this context refers to the number of households. The
second variable, Evacuation Distance is represented as the shortest distance of each
evacuation route intersection from the county exiting point of the evacuation route. In
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other words, the further a household has to travel to evacuate the more likely traffic
problems will be encountered.
This analysis uses a major road GIS layer acquired from the Florida Geographic
Data Library (FGDL 2005). The roadways are defined as major roads by the Florida
Department of Transportation and are acquired from the Florida Geographic Data Library
(FGDL 2005). The evacuation routes were selected from the major roads GIS layer based
on a map from Pinellas County Emergency Management.
The resolution of the road network used in this thesis assumes that all roads are
equal in lane width and traffic rules. For example, two lane roads and six lane highways
are treated equally. Roadways are also bidirectional; however, the direction of a route
may be restricted to one direction to facilitate an evacuation. Interstate 275 is an
exception to these assumptions because both the north and south bound lanes are used as
well as the exit and on ramps. The intersections of the evacuation routes and Interstate
275 are represented as the point where the on ramps connect to the evacuation routes
rather than where the interstate overpasses the evacuation routes.
An important note of this analysis is that the intersections were verified using an
aerial photograph of the county to address certain instances where what appeared to be an
intersection of the GIS road layer was actually an overpass.
The roadways used in the EVI are limited to the major roadways and those major
roadways that comprise the evacuation route network. These roadways were used as
opposed to utilizing all of the roads in Pinellas County because of the census tract spatial
resolution of this analysis. If this analysis were to be carried out at a higher resolution,
such as the census block level, then it would be useful to use the entire road network of
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Pinellas County. However, as discussed earlier, because this analysis is restricted by the
spatial scale of the HAZUS-MH software, this analysis is performed at the census tract
level.
It is important to note that this part of this analysis assumes that the entire county
population is evacuating in the event of a hurricane. Currently, a county wide evacuation
order is not mandatory regardless of a hurricanes intensity. Areas that are required to
evacuate are limited to flood prone areas and coastal areas potentially exposed to storm
surge as mapped in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 Pinellas County Hurricane Evacuation Zones
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Evacuation Route Intersection Load
The Evacuation Route Intersection Load (ERIL) variable is designed to address
the likelihood of congestion at the intersections between evacuation routes and major
roadways. ERIL is calculated by determining the number of households that may enter an
evacuation route via the closest major road intersection. This technique does involve
assumptions. For the purpose of this analysis, the assumption is made that the greater the
number of households utilizing a particular intersection as the entrance point to the
evacuation system, greater the likelihood of traffic problems such as congestion and
accidents increases. Other assumptions of this technique are that a household will
evacuate using one vehicle, use the nearest evacuation intersection, and travel the shortest
distance to evacuate the county. Of course in reality an alternative evacuation route may
be taken, or the evacuation routes may not be used at all.
It is important that I note that traffic conditions of all of the intersections that a
household will encounter along a particular route will obviously affect evacuation
vulnerability. Again, this technique only accounts for the number of households entering
an evacuation route at a major road intersection. The second variable of the EVI,
Evacuation Distance, is designed to address this problem. The greater the distance a
household needs to travel to evacuate, the greater the number of intersections, also
congested, will be encountered in evacuating.
The evacuation route intersection loads are calculated for each intersection of the
major roads of Pinellas County and the evacuation routes. A technique is used where
Theissen polygons are generated for each intersection node, mapped in Figure 3.3. The
number of households using the intersection is computed using an areal interpolation
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technique. A map of the results of this technique is shown in Figure 3.4. For example, if
50 percent of a census tract falls within a particular Theissen polygon and there are 2,000
households within that census tract, then 1,000 households are assigned to the polygon.
The total number of households interpolated from all of the census tracts intersected by
the polygon represents the evacuation route intersection load. This Evacuation Route
Intersection Load is then assigned to the node representing the intersection. Using a GIS
spatial join, the Evacuation Route Intersection Load for each of the nodes is assigned to
the respective census tracts. When more than one node falls within a census tract, the
maximum evacuation household load value is used to represent a worse case scenario.
Census tracts that do not contain an evacuation route intersection are assigned the value
of the nearest evacuation route intersection node. This distance does not use the road
network distance, but instead uses straight line distance, which is a limiting factor in the
analysis and must be noted. The GIS processing used to calculate evacuation load is
briefly described in Figure 3.5. For a detailed chart refer to the Appendix.
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Figure 3.3 Theissen Evacuation Areas
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Figure 3.4 Evacuation Route Intersection Loads of Evacuation Route Intersections
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Figure 3.5 Evacuation Route Intersection Load GIS Processing

53

Evacuation Distance
The second variable of the EVI is Evacuation Distance (ED). This variable
addresses the likelihood that a household will experience traffic problems based on the
distance required to evacuate. This variable is underpinned by the assumption that the
further a household needs to travel to evacuate, the more likely that traffic problems will
be encountered. Also, as discussed earlier in the description of ERIL, more intersections
that may already be suffering from traffic congestion will be encountered.
This method determines evacuation vulnerability based on the distance of the
evacuation route intersection from the nearest evacuation exiting point. This exiting point
is the point that an evacuation route meets the boundary of Pinellas County. Certainly an
individual has not reached safety once exiting Pinellas County and it is not the intention
of this research to make this implication. This method is only an objective way of
determining evacuation distance. Also, the condition of the evacuation network, social
vulnerability, or hurricane risk outside of Pinellas County is not considered. Of course in
reality, conditions outside of Pinellas County affect perceptions and actions of individuals
within the county.
The network distance of the evacuation intersections to the nearest evacuation
route exiting point is calculated using the shortest route function of the Network Analyst
extension in ESRI’s ArcView 3.2. Figure 3.6 maps the evacuation distance of each
intersection to the exiting point. The evacuation distance of each evacuation route
intersection node is assigned to the census tracts that are represented by that node. The
distances of the respective nodes are assigned to each census tract using a spatial join in a
similar manner as described in evacuation route intersection load computation. Tracts that
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do not contain a node are assigned the evacuation distance of the nearest node. Tracts that
contain more than one node are assigned the distance of the node with the lowest
evacuation distance. The lowest distance is used because as discussed earlier, the
assumption is made that a household will evacuate using the shortest route.
The indices for Evacuation Route Intersection Load and Evacuation Distance are
calculated using the same method as previously described for the SVEAI. The
intersection load and evacuation distance values of each tract are divided by their
respective maximum values for the entire county. Index values range from 0 to 1, where
1 represents the greatest evacuation route intersection load and evacuation distance. The
Evacuation Vulnerability Index is calculated as the average value of the Evacuation
Intersection Load Index and the Evacuation Distance Index.
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Figure 3.6 Evacuation Distance of Evacuation Route Intersections
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Hurricane Loss Estimation Index (HLEI)
The geophysical component of the HEVI is derived from the loss estimations
computed by HAZUS-MH as well as determining household exposure to storm surge
using GIS. Storm surge is modeled using an areal interpolation technique that calculates
the percentage of households in each census tract that will be exposed to storm surge. The
probabilistic function of the HAZUS-MH model is used to estimate loss from hurricane
winds and rainfall. Modeling the structural loss and consequent human displacement
answers the third research question of this thesis:
“How vulnerable are people to suffering losses from hurricanes?”
Locating areas that will suffer damages is of course necessary for determining the
areas that need to be evacuated. While areas vulnerable to storm surge and flooding
definitely need to be evacuated, there may be other areas that will suffer wind damage
identified by HAZUS-MH. It is difficult to mandate a countywide evacuation. Advisories
to evacuate should be given to these areas and the government needs to plan to facilitate
evacuation.
The loss estimates from two hurricanes generated by HAZUS-MH with return
periods of 100 years and 1,000 years are used to examine the degree of damage that may
result from these hurricanes as well as the spatial variation of damage. The hurricanes for
the respective return periods shown in Figure 3.7 vary in magnitude and trajectory.
Therefore utilizing these two hurricanes provides variation to the results. These
hurricanes were selected because they differ in probability of occurrence, intensity, and
trajectory. The 1,000 year event is a major hurricane that travels offshore but in close
proximity to Pinellas County and has severe loss estimates. The 100 year event travels a
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northwest trajectory and makes landfall on the south part of the county. The loss
estimates are less severe than the 1,000 year event but are more probable. Indeed other
hurricanes could have been selected from the probabilistic hurricanes generated by
HAZUS-MH. However the loss estimates of the hurricanes with return periods less than
100 years were not severe enough to warrant an evacuation. The loss estimates and
trajectories of the hurricanes with return periods greater than 100 years were similar to
the 1,000 year event and therefore are somewhat redundant for this analysis.
The HAZUS-MH loss estimations used in the HLEI are:
− Probability of at least severe damage to residential homes
− Total displaced households
− Total households with public shelter needs
HAZUS-MH does not estimate losses resulting from storm surge. The effects of
storm surge result in significant losses therefore it is necessary to include a storm surge
component in the HLEI. For the purpose of this thesis, the number of households that
would experience storm surge from hurricanes of the respective return periods is
calculated for each census tract. The HLEI calculation utilizing the 1,000 year hurricane
calculates storm surge at the category four level; the 100 year event includes category
two level storm surge.
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Figure 3.7 HAZUS-MH Probabilistic Hurricane Tracks of Pinellas County: 1,000 Year Event in Red, 100 Year Event in Yellow
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The intensity of the HAZUS-MH generated probabilistic hurricanes is determined
based on the peak gust wind speeds. HAZUS-MH does not report the maximum sustained
wind speeds for theses hurricanes, the program only reports the peak gust winds. The
intensity of the probabilistic hurricanes is determined based on Table 3.1 (FEMA 2005).
The levels of storm surge used in the HLEI are then determined based on the appropriate
hurricane category. For example, if a hurricane has a maximum gust wind speed of 120
miles per hour (over water) the storm surge levels for tropical storms, category one, and
category two hurricanes are used in the calculation.
Table 3.1 Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Categories (FEMA 2005)
SaffirSimpson
Category

Minimum
Central
Pressure
(mb)

Maximum
Sustained Wind
Speed Over Water
(mph)

Maximum
Gust Speed
Over Water
(mph)

Maximum Gust
Speed Over Land,
z = 0.03m (mph)

1

980

74-94

91-116

82-108

2

979-965

94-110

116-140

108-130

3

964-945

110-130

140-165

130-156

4

944-920

130-155

165-195

156-191

5

920

>155

>195

>191

An areal interpolation technique briefly explained earlier is used to calculate the
number of households that would directly experience storm surge. This technique is
based on the model (Chakraborty and Armstrong 1996; Liu 2001; Margai 2001; Most et
al. 2004):
n

P=
i=0

m

Pi +
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j=0

[Pj ( Aje / Aj )]

Where:

P = total population inferred through the interpolation
process.
n = number of geographic units (e.g., census tracts)
contained entirely within the delimiting boundary.
Pi = population of the intact geographic unit, n.
m = those partial geographic units (as might be truncated by
a GIS operation).
Pj = population corresponding to the partial geographic
unit, m.
Aje = the partial area of the truncated geographic unit.
Aj = the total area of the truncated geographic unit.

This formula calculates the number of households in a census tract after a GIS
intersect operation divides the census unit by the storm surge zone. For example, if 4,000
people live in a census tract and 50 percent of the tract is located in the storm surge zone
after it is intersected with the storm surge layer, then there will be 2,000 people, assuming
that the population is evenly distributed.
The GIS storm surge layer used in this calculation is not derived from the specific
path of the HAZUS-MH generated hurricane. It is based on elevation; so in reality
flooding from storm surge may be more severe in some locations than others. Also, while
the level of storm surge, i.e. category four, is determined by the wind speeds over land,
the level of storm surge may be higher or lower based on the characteristics of the
hurricane before it impacts Pinellas County. For example, a hurricane traveling at seven
miles per hour will generate a greater degree of storm surge than one traveling at a faster
speed, everything else being equal. This is because a hurricane with a ‘slower’ translation
speed will have more time to push water away from the eyewall. Dynamic storm surge
modeling would be valuable to this analysis in calculating where storm surge will be
greatest based on the parameters of a specific hurricane. Unfortunately such a model, for
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example the Sea, Lake and Overland Surge Model (SLOSH) is not available for use in
this analysis.
The HLEI is calculated using the mathematical formula described in the SVEAI
index (Chakraborty et al. 2005). The probability of at least severe damage to residential
buildings per census tract is divided by the maximum possible value, 100 percent. The
“At Least Severe Damage to Residential Buildings” variable is the probability that a
home will be severely damaged or completely destroyed. For example, if the maximum
probability of at least severe damage is 100 percent in a particular census tract, then the
tract will be assigned a score of 1.0.
The proportion of displaced households, households with public shelter needs,
and households inundated by storm surge per census tract are also divided by the
maximum possible value, 100 percent. The final HLEI is calculated by averaging the
scores of all of the variables (n = 4).

Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index (HEVI)
The Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is the sum of the Social
Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index (SVEAI), the Evacuation Vulnerability
Index (EVI), and the Hurricane Loss Estimation Index (HLEI) for the 100 year and 1,000
year hurricanes.
Different calculations of the HEVI, or the three indices from which it is derived,
will produce different results. It is also arguable that one or more of the indices are more
or less important in assessing evacuation vulnerability. While it is beyond the scope of
this thesis to develop such an argument, a section is offered at the end of this chapter
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exploring the application of weighting coefficients. This is done to offer variability in the
final results in order to explore how accentuating each of the components affects the
HEVI. Three separate calculations of the HEVI are performed, doubling the value of one
of the three indices. An example equation of this weighting scheme placing emphasis on
the Evacuation Vulnerability Index is:
HEVI = (2 EVI) + SVEAI + HLEI

Summary
The methods described in this chapter combine hurricane vulnerability and loss
modeling to identify where people will have difficulty evacuating from a hurricane.
Social vulnerability modeling is used to assess the degree of difficulty that social groups
will have in evacuating due to societal problems. In addition to social problems, people
may face difficulty in evacuating because of the evacuation network. Evacuees will
encounter a certain degree of traffic congestion caused by traffic bottlenecks at
intersections. Also, the farther an evacuee has to travel to evacuate, the greater the chance
that traffic problems will arise. Modeling the evacuation network in context to
transportation problems addresses these issues.
Incorporating the loss estimates of HAZUS-MH directs response measures to
areas that will suffer from specific hurricanes. This is a dynamic component of this
analysis because of HAZUS-MH. The probabilistic functionality of HAZUS-MH models
hurricanes of different return periods as well as a hurricane forecast to make landfall on
the county. The loss estimates of these hurricanes can be used to assess the evacuation
strategy based on the characteristics of specific hurricanes. These estimates are important
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in terms of vulnerability because the degree of loss of vulnerable social groups can be
determined.
The next chapter describes the results of this analysis. I will begin with explaining
the results of the SVEAI, EVI, and HLEI. Then I will discuss the results of the Hurricane
Evacuation Vulnerability Index compiled with the loss estimates of the two hurricanes
described earlier. Finally, I will examine how weighting the values of the SVEAI, EVI,
and HLEI affect the results of the HEVI.
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Chapter Four
Results
Introduction
The results of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index are used to answer
the following research questions:
1. Where in Pinellas County are people vulnerable to hurricane evacuation
problems?
2. What are the factors that make people vulnerable in an evacuation?
3. How vulnerable are people to suffering losses from hurricanes?
The factors that will cause people to have evacuation difficulty vary by location.
Pinellas County is found to be vulnerable to traffic problems in the event of an
evacuation at locations throughout the county, primarily on the west coast. The
households that need to travel the greatest distance to evacuate are also located in areas
where traffic congestion is the greatest. Conversely, households that may require
assistance in evacuating because they lack the means to evacuate, for example vehicles,
are located in isolated areas. Focusing on geophysical impact, the residential homes
within Pinellas County will experience severe damages from the 1,000 year hurricane
generated by HAZUS-MH. In contrast, the loss estimates from the 100 year hurricane are
minor. The areas that will need to be evacuated from the 100 year hurricane are confined
to the coast so widespread evacuation problems should not be an issue. However, an
evacuation from a major hurricane such as the 1,000 year will require planning. Based on
the loss estimates of HAZUS-MH, the 1,000 year hurricane would severely damage or
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completely destroy residential homes throughout the majority of the county, including
areas that are not within the evacuation planning zones. The modeled results described in
this chapter can be used for evacuation planning and direct emergency response measures
to vulnerable areas, especially in preparation for major hurricanes.
The structure of this chapter is as follows, the first three sections explain the
results of the three sub-indices of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index. Results
of the Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index are explained first, followed
by the Evacuation Vulnerability Index. The results of the Hurricane Loss Estimation
Index is divided into two subsections, first explaining the results using the 1,000 year
hurricane, then the results using the 100 year hurricane. The next section explains the
results of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index. Again, this index is compiled
twice, using the Hurricane Loss Estimation Index of the 1,000 year and 100 year
hurricanes. Thus, the results of the two Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Indices are
explained for each respective hurricane. This section includes an examination of how
applying weighting coefficients to the SVEA, EV, and HLE indices when calculating the
HEVI affects the final results. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the results
and a list of the findings.

Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index (SVEAI)
The most vulnerable area in terms of social vulnerability evacuation assistance is
located in southeastern Pinellas County, as shown in Figure 4.1. The SVEA scores for
the poverty, no telephone, no vehicle, and disabled variables are highest at these census
tracts. It can be argued that the poverty variable, mapped in Figure 4.2, is more
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significant than the telephone and vehicle variables because they are likely to be the
reason that a family does not own a telephone, mapped in Figure 4.3, and certainly not a
vehicle. However, the cause of a high no vehicle score, mapped in Figure 4.4, may also
be due to this vulnerable areas location, downtown St. Petersburg. People may choose not
to own a vehicle because they can use public transportation, walk, etc.
The remaining census tracts of the county have moderate SVEA scores. However,
some small areas relative to the southeast are identified as highly vulnerable. For example
a census tract in the center of the county received a high SVEA score. This is the result of
high scores for the Under Age 5, Institutionalized Population in Group Quarters, Poverty,
and Single Parent variables.
There is also a census tract located in the west coast of the county that received a
high SVEA score. This area has high scores for the Age Under 5, Age Over 85,
Institutionalized Population in Group Quarters, Without a Vehicle, and Single Parent
variables.
Based on the map in Figure 4.1, special evacuation preparations for socially
vulnerable areas are primarily necessary in a small number of locations. However,
emergency management does have another significant variable to consider in evacuation
management, the disabled. Figure 4.5 is a map of the disability index where census tracts
with high values are distributed throughout the county. The disabled may require
transportation assistance in the event of an evacuation.
It is interesting to note that high values for the population institutionalized in
group quarters, ages under 5, and ages over 85 variables are found in relatively few
census tracts in Pinellas County when compared to the other variables, especially
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poverty. The majority of the census tracts received very low scores for these variables as
shown in Figures 4.6; 4.7, and 4.8, respectively. Certainly, this does not indicate that
these variables are not important to social vulnerability modeling. These results are only
representative of Pinellas County’s demographic composition. Performing this analysis in
another county or metropolitan area will probably have different results. From an
emergency management perspective, the results of these variables for Pinellas County
can aid in response and recovery. The areas represented by census tracts with high values
for the three variables can be areas of concern for emergency managers. For example, the
census tract in the center of the county in Figure 4.1 may require public transportation to
evacuate the very young and very old.
The results for the single parent variable are mapped in Figure 4.9. This variable
scored very high for the majority of the census tracts throughout the county. Assisting the
single parent population in evacuating may not be effective due to the large number of
single parent households, however in planning for hurricane response it may be useful to
communicate ways that a single parent can prepare for a hurricane. For example, allow
more time to prepare to evacuate or ask for assistance from a friend or family member.
An issue that is of concern in the Tampa Bay area is the number of mobile and
manufactured homes that are subject to mandatory evacuations during even minor
hurricanes. The manufactured homes variable is mapped in Figure 4.10. These homes are
located primarily in the central and northern areas of Pinellas County where 25 percent to
50 percent of the housing units are designated as mobile homes by the U.S. Census as
shown in Figure 4.11. These areas will definitely need to evacuate during a major
hurricane and the evacuation strategy must address the people living in these homes.
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Figure 4.1 Social Vulnerability Evacuation Assistance Index per Census Tract
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Figure 4.2 SVEAI: Poverty Index per Census Tract
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Figure 4.3 SVEAI: No Telephone Index per Census Tract
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Figure 4.4 SVEAI: No Vehicle Index per Census Tract
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Figure 4.5 SVEAI: Disabled Index per Census Tract
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Figure 4.6 SVEAI: Institutionalized Population in Group Quarters Index per Census Tract
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Figure 4.7 SVEAI: Population Under Age 5 Index per Census Tract
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Figure 4.8 SVEAI: Population Over 85 Index per Census Tract
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Figure 4.9 SVEAI: Single Parent Population Index per Census Tract
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Figure 4.10 SVEAI: Manufactured Homes Index per Census Tract
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Figure 4.11 Percentage of Mobile Homes per Census Tract
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Evacuation Vulnerability Index (EVI)
Based on the map of the EVI in Figure 4.12, the population of western Pinellas
County is most vulnerable to traffic problems during an evacuation. There are two areas
in particular that are the most vulnerable within the county.
Households in the southwest census tracts are identified as vulnerable because of
both high Evacuation Route Intersection Load and Evacuation Distance values, mapped
in Figures 4.13 and 4.14, respectively. Here, the households will not only have to travel
the greatest distance to evacuate when compared with the rest of Pinellas County, but are
also most vulnerable to traffic congestion based on the Evacuation Route Intersection
Load variable.
The other area with high evacuation vulnerability values is along the northern
coast. While the tracts do not have high Evacuation Distance values like the southwest,
there are high Evacuation Route Intersection Load values.
The results of the Evacuation Vulnerability Index are especially interesting when
compared with the SVEAI map, described earlier. While areas identified as socially
vulnerable are located primarily in southeastern Pinellas County, areas that may
experience evacuation difficulty due to the condition of the evacuation routes are more
widespread. Traffic management can be directed to specific evacuation routes (based on
the EVI based on the map) in Figure 4.15.
Spatial resolution is an important factor that affects the results of the EVI. As
described earlier, the indices are mapped at the census tract level. Performing this
analysis at a spatial resolution of greater precision, such as the census block group or
census block level will produce more detailed maps of the EVI. Furthermore, including
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all of the roads in Pinellas County, and perhaps a road network with greater detail, will
allow for more detailed analysis of evacuation vulnerability in relation to transportation.
Figure 4.12 Evacuation Vulnerability Index
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Figure 4.13 EVI: Evacuation Route Intersection Load
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Figure 4.14 EVI: Evacuation Distance
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Figure 4.15 Evacuation Vulnerability Index and Evacuation Routes

Evacuation Vulnerability
Index
0.68 - 0.83
0.53 - 0.67
0.38 - 0.52

Highest
Vulnerability

AVG Value: 0.52

0.23 - 0.37

0 1 2

0.07 - 0.22

4

6
Miles

Pinellas Co. Evacuation Route
Pinellas Co. Major Rd.
FL Major Rd.

84

8

10

Hurricane Loss Estimation Index (HLEI)
The following section summarizes the results of the Hurricane Loss
Estimation Index compiled separately for the 1,000 year and 100 year hurricanes
generated by HAZUS-MH. These two hurricanes were selected because they have
different probabilities of occurrence, intensities, and trajectories. The indices compiled
with these hurricanes are important in locating where severe damages will likely occur
from specific hurricanes. Locating areas that are likely to suffer severe damage is of
course necessary for determining the areas that need to be evacuated. Compiling the
HLEI with the two HAZUS-MH generated hurricanes allows for loss estimates based on
probability of occurrence, and examination of the spatial distribution of damages
depending on the parameters of a hurricane.

1,000 Year Hurricane
The entire county will suffer severe losses during the 1,000 year event. The areas
that are not be exposed to category four storm surge will experience very high winds in
excess of 150 miles per hour resulting in wind damage, mapped in Figure 4.16.
The Hurricane Loss Estimation Index is mapped in Figure 4.17. The coastal areas
of Pinellas County are most vulnerable from the 1,000 year event particularly because of
storm surge. The high scores in the storm surge exposure index mapped in Figure 4.18
represent the large number of households in southeast Pinellas County that will be
flooded by storm surge. The east coast of the county bordering Tampa Bay will also
experience the strongest winds from the 1,000 year event, with estimates that peak gusts
will exceed 160 miles per hour. However, because HAZUS-MH does not currently model
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storm surge, the loss estimates from the 1,000 year hurricane winds and rainfall are
greatest on the west coast of the county which is closest to the track of the hurricane.
The census tracts with the highest values of the At Least Severe Residential Home
Damage Index, mapped in Figure 4.19, are located along the west coast of the county.
Even thought the highest values of this index are along the coast, residential homes in the
remainder of the county have high damage probabilities. There is at least a forty to sixty
percent chance that homes will be severely damaged or completely destroyed in 62
percent of the census tracts in the county as mapped in Figure 4.20.
The displaced households variable is calculated by HAZUS-MH as the number of
households that will be displaced for at least 30 days (FEMA 2005). This variable can aid
in not only identifying high loss areas but also in recovery measures. For example,
temporary trailers can be brought in to provide shelter. The Displaced Household Index
mapped in Figure 4.21 has a similar pattern as the At Least Severe Residential Home
Damage Index. Coastal areas will experience the greatest number of displaced
households because of coastal flooding from storm surge, but the 1,000 year hurricane
will also displace a significant number of households along the west coast of Pinellas
County. Households in this area will be displaced because of wind damage and rainfall
because storm surge, mapped in Figure 4.22 does not travel as far inland as it does on the
east coast of the county. It is important to note that the east coast of the county is
vulnerable to storm surge and the number of households displaced will be greater than the
HAZUS-MH results.
The Public Shelter Index is mapped in Figure 4.23. This map is similar to the
displaced households index map because the number of households that HAZUS-MH
86

estimates will seek public shelters is dependent on the number of displaced households.
There is a high concentration of these shelter seeking households in southeast Pinellas
County. This is the same area identified by the SVEAI as being highly vulnerable. This is
logical since HAZUS-MH identifies social groups such as the poor may need to evacuate
to a public shelter because they have nowhere else to go.
The results of this HLEI show how it is necessary to continually update the
evacuation strategy and evacuation planning zones, mapped in Figure 4.24 as loss
modeling improves.
Figure 4.16 Peak Wind Gusts of the HAZUS-MH 1,000 Year Hurricane
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Figure 4.17 Hurricane Loss Estimation Index 1,000 Year Event
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Figure 4.18 1,000 Year HLEI: Households Exposed to Category 4 Hurricane Storm Surge
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Figure 4.19 1,000 Year HLEI: At Least Severe Damage to Residential Homes
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Figure 4.20 Probability of At Least Severe Damage to Residential Homes 1,000 Year Hurricane
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Figure 4.21 1,000 Year HLEI: Displaced Households
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Figure 4.22 Category 4 Hurricane Storm Surge
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Figure 4.23 1,000 Year HLEI: Households with Short Term Public Shelter Needs
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Figure 4.24 Pinellas County Emergency Management Evacuation Planning Zones
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100 Year Hurricane
The HLEI was computed using the loss estimates of the 100 year hurricane to
examine the results of a hurricane with a lesser intensity and different track than the
1,000 year hurricane. The 100 year event is a category two hurricane with peak gust
winds ranging from 114 to 124 miles per hour as mapped in Figure 4.25. The hurricane
eye makes landfall on south Pinellas County. This hurricane has a northwest trajectory as
opposed to the 1,000 year hurricane described earlier which has a north northeast
trajectory. Storm surge, mapped in Figure 4.26, representing category one and two
hurricanes, as well as tropical storm surge, was computed into the HELI. This
computation used the same method described in the HELI computation of the 1,000 year
hurricane.
The estimated loss from this hurricane is most severe along the coast, especially
on the east side of the county. This area is exposed to the most intensive part of a
hurricane, the front right quadrant, and will experience the greatest peak gust winds along
with storm surge. Again, Figure 4.26 shows category two storm surge that inundates the
county along upper Tampa Bay.
The areas with the highest HLEI values mapped in Figure 4.27 are those areas
that will suffer from storm surge. In context to evacuation, households in these coastal
areas will need to evacuate. In comparison to the 1,000 year event, the inland areas will
not experience a significant degree of damage. For example, the map of the At Least
Severe Damage Index in Figure 4.28 shows that the highest values are 0.11 out of a
possible 1.0. This damage estimate is low when comparing this index to that of the 1,000
Year HLEI where the values range from 0.41 to 0.80.
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Figure 4.25 Peak Gust Winds HAZUS-MH 100 Year Hurricane

100 Year
Hurricane Track

Peak Gust Wind Speeds (mph)
100 Year Hurricane
114 - 116
117 - 118
119 - 120
121 - 122
123 - 124

0 1 2

4

6
Miles

97

8

10

Figure 4.26 Category 2 Storm Surge
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Figure 4.27 Hurricane Loss Estimation Index 100 Year Event
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Figure 4.28 100 Year HLEI: At Least Severe Residential Home Damage
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Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index (HEVI)
The HEVI is the sum of the SVEAI, EVI, and the HLEI. The HEVI is calculated
twice using the HLEI for the 100 year and 1,000 year hurricanes. Again, these two
hurricanes were selected because they have different probabilities of occurrence,
intensities, and trajectories. Compiling the HEVI with the HLE indices of the 1,000 year
and 100 year hurricanes is important in locating areas where severe losses will be
suffered and examining the spatial distribution of damage based on these hurricanes. The
final map of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index allows for the examination of
where evacuation orders and resources need to be directed.
In this section, the results of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index for
each respective hurricane are discussed. Then, the variability of results when weighting
coefficients are applied to the three components of the HEVI is explained.

Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index: 1,000 Year Hurricane
The 1,000 year event is a category four hurricane, based on the peak gust wind
speeds over Pinellas County. A HEVI is calculated for this event because it represents a
worse case scenario for the county, as explained earlier. This hurricane does not make
landfall on Pinellas County, however the high winds, rainfall, and storm surge generated
by this hurricane would result in extensive damages according to the loss estimates of
HAZUS-MH.
The map in Figure 4.29 shows high HEV values in southern Pinellas County and
the coastal areas. Tracts with high values in the southeast are attributable to the Hurricane
Loss Estimate and Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Indices. As discussed
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earlier, the most vulnerable social groups reside primarily in the southeast of the county,
the majority of the county will be able to mentally and physically cope with the stresses
of responding to hurricanes. The southeast will also suffer from the strongest peak gust
winds relative to the rest of the county along with the most significant flooding from
storm surge, mapped in Figure 4.30. The high HEVI values in the remainder of the
county are due to high HLEI and EVI values.
Based on the results of the HLEI for the 1,000 year hurricane, it is arguable that
the entire population of Pinellas County should evacuate. There are areas identified by
the HAZUS-MH model that will sustain significant wind and flood damage from rainfall
from the 1,000 year event but not suffer losses from storm surge. For example, in Figure
4.31, there are two ‘islands’ that are not covered by the evacuation zones, but the
probability of at least severe damage to the residential homes in these areas ranges from
forty one to eighty percent, especially the census tracts highlighted in dark blue along the
coast. Figure 4.32 better shows the full map of the At Least Severe Damage Index.
Comparing the HEVI map and the evacuation planning zones in Figure 4.33, there are
census tracts with high values not within the evacuation planning zones. These census
tracts have high EVI scores, mapped again in Figure 4.34.
Mandating a countywide evacuation is difficult because of enforcement issues.
However, advising these areas to evacuate should be considered. It is also important that
a countywide, or at least a very large scale evacuation is planned for and resources
allocated to deal with evacuation problems.
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Figure 4.29 Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index 1,000 Year Hurricane
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Figure 4.30 HAZUS-MH 1,000 Year Hurricane Peak Gust Winds and Category 4 Surge
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Figure 4.31 At Least Severe Damage to Residential Homes & Evacuation Zones
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Figure 4.32 HLEI 1,000: At Least Severe Damage Index
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Figure 4.33 Comparison of Pinellas County Evacuation Planning Zones & HEVI 1,000 Year Hurricane
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Figure 4.34 Evacuation Vulnerability Index
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Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index: 100 Year Hurricane
The loss estimates of the 100 year event, a category two hurricane provides more
probable and less severe loss estimates than the 1,000 year event. This hurricane has a
northwesterly track as it travels over Florida before impacting Pinellas County. The eye
of the 100 year hurricane travels a northwesterly track over south Pinellas County. The
front right quadrant, the most powerful part of an Atlantic hurricane covers a large
portion of the Tampa Bay region. Calculating the HEVI using the loss estimations from
this hurricane produces results similar to the 1,000 Year HEVI, Figure 4.35. Of course,
the 100 year hurricane is of a lesser intensity than the 1,000 year event resulting in lower
HEVI values, Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of 100 Year HEVI and 1,000 Year HEVI
HEVI 100
HEVI 1,000

No. Tracts
208

Minimum
.41

Maximum
1.23

Mean
.79

Std. Deviation
.17

208

.73

1.67

1.16

.19

The HEVI representing the 100 year is mapped in Figure 4.36. It is important to
emphasize that the evacuation vulnerability component of the HEVI is based on a county
wide evacuation rather than defined zones such as the evacuation planning zones
delineated by the local emergency management agency. It is arguable that modeling a
countywide evacuation is not necessary for a minor hurricane. In context to the 100 year
hurricane, a vulnerability analysis of the evacuation system where only households in
designated evacuation zones, mapped in Figure 4.37 are evacuated will produce different
results when compiling the HEVI. Performing such an analysis is subject to further
research of evacuation vulnerability modeling.
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Figure 4.35 Comparison of HEVI 100 Year and HEVI 1,000 Year.
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Figure 4.36 Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index 100 Year Hurricane
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Figure 4.37 Evacuation Planning Zones
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Index Weighting
As explained in the methodology, the HEVI is the calculated as the sum of the
three indices (SVEAI, EVI, HLEI). This approach is straight forward. However using a
different equation to calculate the HEVI will produce different results. Further research
and testing is necessary to examine the variability of modeled results by calculating the
indices using different equations. However, this section examines the results of the HEVI
change when applying a weight to each of the three indices in the calculation of the
HEVI. This was done three separate times, doubling the value of one of the three indices
in each calculation. An example equation of this weighting scheme placing emphasis on
the Evacuation Vulnerability Index is:
HEVI = (2 EVI) + SVEAI + HLEI
Looking at the descriptive statistics in Table 4.2, the resulting HEVI values with
the weights applied are similar, although of course greater than the Hurricane Evacuation
Vulnerability Index in which weights are not applied. The weighted HEV Indices are
mapped in Figures 4.38 through 4.40. While the degree of vulnerability of the tracts
slightly varies between each of the maps, the overall pattern of Hurricane Evacuation
Vulnerability is consistent with the map of the non-weighted HEVI, shown again in
Figure 4.41. Looking at the distribution of values for each of the calculations, again the
histograms in Figure 4.42 share a similar pattern. This is important because it allows the
application of weights to the HEVI without dramatically changing the final results. A
component of the HEVI can be accentuated but the results will still be reliable in
identifying vulnerable areas that will need evacuation assistance.
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Weighted HEVI

HEVI
HEVI (2 SVEAI)
HEVI (2 HLEI)
HEVI (2 EVI)

No. of
Tracts
208
208
208
208

Minimum Maximum
.73
1.67
.85
1.99
1.05
2.35
.88
2.50

Std.
Deviation
.18880
.23399
.26169
.31516

Mean
1.1586
1.3371
1.6173
1.6803

Figure 4.38 1,000 Year HEVI: Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance
Index values doubled.
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Figure 4.39 1,000 Year HEVI: Hurricane Loss Estimation Index values doubled.
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Figure 4.40 1,000 Year HEVI: Evacuation Vulnerability Index values doubled.
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Figure 4.41 1,000 Year HEVI: Weights are not applied.
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Figure 4.42 Distribution of HEVI values using weighting coefficients in the HEVI
calculation.
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Summary
The results of this methodology show how combining aspects of social
vulnerability, transportation, and loss modeling can show where evacuation problems will
most likely occur based on social and transportation factors and the degree of damage
these areas may suffer from hurricanes. In Pinellas County, social groups that do not have
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the resources to evacuate are located in isolated areas where losses will be severe,
especially from storm surge. Conversely, areas where people are vulnerable to traffic
problems are widespread. These areas, located along the west coast of Pinellas County,
will suffer wind damage from a major hurricane traveling north along the coast. Storm
surge however, will not be as severe as in eastern Pinellas County.
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Chapter Five
Conclusions
Introduction
This multifaceted approach to vulnerability analysis is important to
Comprehensive Emergency Management programs because it enhances each of the four
phases of CEM; planning, response, recovery, and mitigation. Evaluating the current
evacuation plan in context to hurricane evacuation vulnerability can help determine if the
plan is adequate. Resources can be allocated to assist in evacuation at highly vulnerable
areas identified by the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index. These areas can be
analyzed further to determine the factors that affect vulnerability so these factors can be
addressed to increase safety. Perhaps a particular area has a high degree of social
vulnerability and needs transportation assistance such as busing. An area may have a high
evacuation vulnerability score and may need additional police personnel to control traffic.
Traffic management techniques such as contraflow, where lanes are reversed on
highways to direct traffic flow in one direction, can be used to clear congested areas.
For whatever reasons a place may be vulnerable, the results of this analysis are useful in
prioritizing the locations where response measures are needed.
Loss modeling is important to hurricane evacuation studies because it integrates
an element of risk into vulnerability analysis. HAZUS-MH is a valuable loss model
because it models hurricane risk by simulating hurricane scenarios based on probability
120

of occurrence, intensity, and potential damages. Using the model results of HAZUS-MH
in evacuation planning can aid in determining where people will need to be evacuated.
These model results are also useful in developing mitigation to reduce future losses and
reduce vulnerability.

Conclusions
The results of this thesis show that emergency response measures need to be
directed at not only places that are socially vulnerable and at risk from suffering sever
damage, but also at places where the conditions of the evacuation routes makes people
vulnerable in evacuating.
Pinellas County has fewer locations where social vulnerability is an issue when
compared to the number of locations that may experience traffic problems during a
countywide evacuation. While the county emergency management agency must provide
assistance to vulnerable social groups living in areas such as the southeast, the entire
county will require traffic management to decrease vulnerability during a major
evacuation, especially if the entire county evacuates.
The two hurricanes modeled in this thesis generated by HAZUS-MH are
different in probability, intensity, and trajectory. However, there are locations that are
estimated to suffer loss from either hurricane and certainly need to be included when
delimiting evacuation planning zones and designating roads as evacuation routes. Certain
locations that will suffer building damage and displacement of households are also
identified as highly vulnerable with the SVEA and EV Indices. There are also locations
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that may suffer losses during the 1,000 year event that are not within evacuation planning
zones.
It is arguable that due to the low probability of this event that countywide
evacuation planning is not reasonable. However due to the high consequences of this
hurricane, the loss of life that would occur by not evacuating these areas is of course
inexcusable. It is also imperative that the term 1,000 year event be understood for what it
is, a statistical measure derived from 150 year record of Atlantic hurricanes. While the
probability of a hurricane with the exact characteristics (trajectory, wind speed) of the
1,000 year event to occur is low, the impact from a hurricane with similar characteristics
as this will be severe. Loss estimates similar to this event can be expected from a major
hurricane traveling parallel to the coastline of Pinellas County. Again, these loss
estimates are only as accurate as HAZUS-MH, but even with the degree of error of this
model, the evacuation strategy can be improved by incorporating the loss estimates in
hurricane preparation. It is also important that I note that by developing a building
inventory to replace the default inventory that is supplied with HAZUS-MH, the accuracy
of the modeled results can be improved.
A hurricane such as the 100 year category two event modeled in this thesis should
not require a major evacuation. Instead, evacuation should only need to take place in
coastal areas. This analysis is useful in determining where evacuation assistance is
needed. Traffic during an evacuation for a minor hurricane may be manageable; however
there are areas in southeast Pinellas County where people may not be able to evacuate by
their own means. It is important, as we saw in the case of Hurricane Katrina’s impact on
New Orleans, that these people receive evacuation assistance.
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The Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is a valuable tool for evacuation
planning. Emergency management officials can use the results to assess the adequacy of
the evacuation resources. For example, the percentage of population living within the five
zones of the 1,000 Year Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index (showing the
percentage of population within each zone for each weighted index) is shown in Table
4.3. The social characteristics of the two highest zones are shown in Table 4.4. This table
is useful for allocating resources, such as buses, to assist people in evacuating.
Table 4.3 Percent of County Population Living within 1,000 Year Hurricane Evacuation
Vulnerability Zones
Degree of Evacuation
HEVI
HEVI (2 SVEAI)
HEVI (2 HLEI)
HEVI (2 EVI)
Vulnerability
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Lowest
Low
Medium
High
Highest
Total Percent

10.65
24.13
38.15
22.37
4.69

9.51
26.77
35.03
22.73
5.96

8.86
24.47
38.95
23.49
4.22

5.58
35.84
29.43
25.06
4.09

100

100

100

100

Table 4.4 Percentage of Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index Variables
within Two Highest 1,000 Year Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Zones.
HEVI
HEVI
HEVI
Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance
HEVI
(2 SVEAI)
(2 HLEI)
(2 EVI)
Variable
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Total Population
27.06
28.69
27.71
29.15
Occupied Housing Units
27.03
28.90
27.38
30.03
Mobile Homes
34.24
47.95
36.36
28.58
Population below poverty level
26.06
38.02
25.70
26.13
Occupied Housing Units without Telephones
29.38
50.39
29.52
29.35
Occupied Housing Units without Vehicles
31.24
42.96
30.92
31.92
Institutionalized Population in Group Quarters
27.45
55.79
47.26
23.80
Population ages 5 years and under
28.00
47.25
38.64
24.52
Population ages 85 and over
33.88
35.48
33.21
34.56
Population over age 5 with disabilities
28.72
33.59
28.03
30.46
Single Parent Households
24.10
33.45
22.61
25.91
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Future Analyses
This analysis has a number of limitations that can be addressed to increase the
spatial resolution of the model. HAZUS-MH is still a relatively new technology,
especially the hurricane model. Increasing the spatial resolution of the hurricane model to
the census block group or block level would enable the Hurricane Evacuation
Vulnerability Index to be compiled at a larger scale. The demographic data is available to
calculate the SVEAI at the census block group or block levels.
Increasing the spatial resolution would be beneficial to the Evacuation
Vulnerability Index because the entire road network of Pinellas County could be
modeled. Instead of modeling only the major roads (which are typically the boundaries of
census tracts) and the intersections with evacuation routes, the entire road network of the
county could be modeled assigning EV scores to block groups or blocks.
Recalling the GIS methods used in developing the framework for the Evacuation
Vulnerability Index in Chapter Three, Theissen polygons were generated in order to
calculate the number of households using each evacuation route intersection. This
technique is commonly used for estimating the occurrence or quantity of a particular
phenomenon near a point, however in context to this analysis there are drawbacks in
using this method. There are instances in this analysis where a portion of a census tract’s
households were assigned to an evacuation intersection where in reality those households
would not use the intersection because of a body of water would prevent access. A
specific GIS algorithm needs to be developed to solve this problem.
Increasing the resolution of the road network would allow for other types of
evacuation analyses. In particular, the evaluation of the current evacuation route system
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as well as identifying other roads or combination of roads that could be used for
evacuation. A road network that includes one way roads, intersections with limited
turning options, and the number of lanes of each road could be developed. Now this
certainly would take a great deal of time, man power, and money but it would be
beneficial to evacuation and transportation analyses in general.
Modeling evacuation vulnerability for hazards such as hurricanes does not have to
be limited to evacuation routes. In this thesis, the loss estimates of the 100 year hurricane
were low enough where a county wide evacuation is not warranted. However, coastal
areas that would experience flooding would need to evacuate. Within this population, a
number of people may need to seek public hurricane shelters for refuge. It is reasonable
to argue that the access and proximity to these shelters would affect vulnerability. Thus,
developing a model of vulnerability based on shelter availability and proximity would be
beneficial to hurricane response.
The evacuation vulnerability component of this analysis can be elaborated upon
by modeling a smaller scale evacuation than the countywide scenario. This type of
analyses would probably be more useful in context to the 100 year hurricane because
again, a limited area would need to evacuate rather than the entire county. Compiling an
Evacuation Vulnerability Index in context to these locations would be useful in
determining where evacuation assistance will be needed within these evacuation zones.
Addressing the geophysical component of this thesis, modeling the impact from
storm surge would be more realistic with a dynamic storm surge model such as SLOSH.
The GIS layer used in this thesis to model storm surge is based on the elevation of land
and the degree of storm surge that can be expected from a hurricane based on intensity.
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Storm surge is a complicated phenomenon where the height of tide and hurricane
characteristics, for example travel direction and speed of onset, are just a number of
factors that affect the degree of storm surge a county may experience.
HAZUS-MH estimates losses of a greater number of types of structures than
residential homes, used in this thesis. Damages to critical facilities such as hospitals, and
business facilities are detrimental not only to emergency response, but also to the
socioeconomic strength of the community. There are multiple avenues that can be
traveled using HAZUS-MH.
Regarding spatial scale, this vulnerability assessment is performed at the county
level, however including neighboring counties, such as in the case of this thesis,
Hillsborough, Pasco, and Manatee would be useful for analyzing evacuation at a regional
scale. This is important because the demographics of the entire Tampa Bay metropolitan
area, as well as the conditions of the built environment, including the roadways will
affect Pinellas County’s evacuation vulnerability.
Finally, cognitive research of evacuation is important in enhancing this
methodology. Many assumptions are made regarding evacuation, for example the route
people will take to leave at risk areas. Studying people’s perceptions to evacuation
orders, consequences of evacuating or staying home, and how people plan their own
evacuation strategy will help understand this human element of hurricane response.

126

References
ArcView 3.2. Environmental Systems Research Institute. Redlands, CA.
ArcGIS 9.1. Environmental Systems Research Institute. Redlands, CA.
Bales, Emory Scott., and William Waugh Jr. “All-Hazards, Operational Emergency
Management Information Systems: A Lesson to be Learned from Hurricane
Andrew.” Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada. Ed. Richard T. Sylves
and William Waugh Jr. Springfield: Thomas. 1996. 327-343.
Barnes, Jay. Florida’s Hurricane History. Chapel Hill: Univ. North Carolina Press, 1998.
Barret, Bridget, Bin Ran, Rekha Pillai. “Developing a dynamic traffic management
modeling framework for hurricane evacuation.” Proceedings of the 79th Annual
Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, January 9-13, 2000.
BOND (Board on Natural Disasters). “Mitigation emerges as major strategy for reducing
losses caused by natural disasters.” Science. 284. (1999): 1943-1947.
Burton, I., Kates, R. W., and White, G. F. The Environment as Hazard. New York:
Guilford, 1993.
Campbell, J. Dealing with Disaster, Hurricane Responses in Fiji. Suva: Pacific Islands
Development Programme, East-West Center of the Government of Fiji. (1984).
Comerio, Mary. Disaster Hits Home: New Policy for Urban Housing Recovery.
Berkeley: Univ. California Press, 1998.
Chakraborty, J., and Marc P. Armstrong. “Using geographic plume analysis to assess
community vulnerability to hazardous accidents.” Computers, Environment, and
Urban Systems 19 5.6 (1996): 341-345.
Chakraborty, J., Lisa A. Schweitzer, David J. Forkenbrock. “Using GIS to asses the
environmental justice consequences of transportation system changes.”
Transactions in GIS, 3.3 (1999): 239-258
Chakraborty, J., Tobin, G. A., and Montz, B. E. “Population Evacuation: Assessing
Spatial Variability in Geophysical Risk and Social Vulnerability to Natural
Hazards.” Natural Hazards Review, 6.1 (2005): 23-33.
127

Church, Richard L., and Ryan M. Sexton. Modeling small area evacuation: Can existing
transportation infrastructure impede public safety? Technical Report. Vehicle
Intelligence & Transportation Analysis Laboratory and Department of
Geography. University of California at Santa Barbara. Santa Barbara, CA. (2002).
Coles, Eve., Denis Smith, and Steve Tombs, eds. Risk Management and Society. Boston:
Kluwer, 2000.
Cova, T. J., and Church, R. L. “Modeling community evacuation vulnerability using
GIS.” Int. J. Geographic Information Science, 11.8 (1997): 763-784.
Cova. Thomas J., Michael F. Goodchild. “Extending geographical representation to
include spatial objects”. Geographical Information Science. 16(2) 2002: 509-532.
Cova, T.J., and Conger, S. (2004) “Transportation hazards.” In Handbook of
Transportation Engineering, M. Kutz (ed.), New York: McGraw Hill, 2004.
17.1-17.24.
Cova, Thomas J., and Justin P. Johnson. “Microsimulation of neighborhood evacuations
in the urban-wildland interface”. Environment and Planning. vol. 34. 2211-2229.
2002.
Cova, Thomas J., and Justin P. Johnson. “A network flow model for lane-based
evacuation routing”. Transportation Research Part A. 37. (2003): 579-604.
Cova, Thomas J., and Richard L. Church. “Modeling community evacuation vulnerability
using GIS”. International Journal of Geographical Information Science. 11.8.
(1997): 763-784.
Cutter, Susan L., “Vulnerability to environmental hazards”. Progress in human
geography. 20.4 (1996): 529-539.
Cutter, Susan L. American Hazardscapes: The Regionalization of Hazards and Disasters.
Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press, 2001.
Dean, C. Against the Tide: The Battle for America’s Beaches. New York: Columbia
University Press. 1999
De Silva, F. Nisha. “Providing spatial decision support for evacuation planning: a
challenge integrating technologies.” Disaster Prevention and Management. 10(1)
2001: 11-20.
Elsner, James B., and A. Birol Kara. Hurricanes of the North Atlantic: Climate and
Society. New York: Oxford, 1999.
128

Federal Emergency Management Agency. HAZUS-MH Hurricane Model Technical
Manual, Washington D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005(a).
32-38.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. HAZUS-MH Hurricane Model User Manual,
Washington D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005(b). 22-25.
Florida Geographic Data Library. 2005. University of Florida GeoPlan Center.
<http://www.fgdl.org/download/v2004_download.html>
(Viewed September 2005)
Haddow, George D., and Jane E. Bullock. Introduction to Emergency Management. New
York: Butterworth, 2003.
HAZUS-MH. Version MR-1. Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Washington, D.C.
Landsea, Christopher S., J.L. Franklin, C.J. McAdie, J.L. Beven II, J.M. Gross, B.R.
Jarvenin, R.J. Pasch, E.N. Rappaport, J.P. Dunion, P.P. Dodge. “A reanalysis of
Hurricane Andrew’s intensity”. American Meteorological Society. November
(2004). 1699-1712.
Lindell, M.K., and R.W. Perry. Behavioral Foundations of Community Emergency
Planning. Washington: Hemisphere, 1992.
Lindsay, John R. “The detemininants of disaster vulnerabiklity: Achieveing sustainable
mitigation trhough population health”. Natural Hazards. 28 (2003): 291-304.
Liu, Feng. Environmental justice analysis. Boca Raton, FL. Lewis Publishers, 2001.
Margai, Florence Lansana. “Health risks and environmental inequity: A geographical
analysis of accidental releases to hazardous materials.” The Professional
Geographer. 53 (August, 2001): 422-434.
Mileti, Dennis S. Disasters by Design. Washington D.C.: Joseph Henry Press. 1999.
Most, Michael T., Raja Sengrupta and Micheal Burgener. “Spatial scale and population
assignment choices in environmental justice analysis.” The Professional
Geographer 56.4 (2004): 581-582.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 2005.
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/surge/slosh.shtml
(Viewed September 2005)

129

Pielke, R.A., Jr., “Reframing the U.S. Hurricane Problem.” Society and Natural
Resources. 10. (1997): 485-499.
Pinellas County Socioeconomic Report. June, 2004. Pinellas County Planning Dept. 600
Cleveland St., Suite 750. Clearwater, FL 33755.
Pinellas County Local Mitigation Strategy. December, 2003.
Pinellas County Emergency Management. 2005.
http://www.pinellascounty.org/emergency/default.htm
(Viewed September 2005)
Rappaport, E.N., “Hurricane Andrew.” Weather. 49 (1994): 51-61.
Russo, F. and A. Vinetta. “Models and Algorithms for Evacuation Analysis in Urban
Road Transportation Systems.” Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics. Ed.
Michael Schreckenburg. New York: Springer, 2002.
Sheets, Bob., and Jack Williams. Hurricane Watch. New York: Vintage, 2001.
Stahel, Walter R., “Incentives for loss prevention instead of disaster management by the
state of catastrophic risks.” Risk Management and Society. Ed. Eve Coles, Denis
Smith, and Steve Tombs. Boston: Kluwer, 2000. 81-100.
Slovic, Paul. “Perception of Risk.” Science. 236. (1987): 283.
Tobin, G.A., and B.E. Montz. Natural Hazards: Explanation and integration. New York:
Guilford, 1997.
Tobin, G.A. and Montz, B.E. “Natural Hazards and Technology: Vulnerability, Risk, and
Community Response in Hazardous Environments.” In S.D. Brunn, S.L. Cutter,
and J.W. Harrington (Ed.) Technoearth: A Social History of Geography and
Technology. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004. Chapter 23, 547-570.
Tobin, G.A., Hughey, E.P., and Miller, R., “What if Hurricane Charley made landfall at
Tampa Bay? Modeling the Impacts.” The Florida Geographer. 35 (2004): 4-12.
Tobin, G.A., Hughey, E.P., Bell, H., Everist, M., Kelsey, C. and Miller, R. Hurricane
Charley: The Aftermath. Technical Report. Department of Geography, University
of South Florida, Tampa, Florida. 2005.
United States Bureau of the Census. 2005. http://factfinder.census.gov
(Viewed September 2005)

130

Waugh, William Jr. “Current Policy and Implementation in Disaster Preparedness.”
Managing Disasters: Strategies and Policy Perspectives. Ed. Louise K. Comfort.
Durham: Duke U. 1988. 111-125.
Watson, Charles C. Jr., and Mark E. Johnson, “Hurricane Loss Optimization Models”
American Meteorological Society. November (2004). 1713-1726
Williams, John M., and Iver W. Duedall. Florida Hurricanes and Tropical Storms: 18712001. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002.
Wisner, Ben, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis. At Risk: Natural Hazards,
people’s vulnerability and disasters. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2004.

131

Appendix: Evacuation Route Intersection Load GIS Processing Flowchart

Continued on next page.
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